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THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OF 1974
Lee Hargrave*
The Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 1974 was viewed
by many delegates to the Constitutional Convention as a radical
document making extreme innovations. If one compares the new Bill
of Rights with that of the 1921 Constitution, one can easily support
that view. In comparison with the existing United States Supreme
Court constructions of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the
United States, however, the innovations in the new state document
are minimal. In some areas, expansions beyond current decisions
were made; in others, the federal standard is still the stricter one.
Whereas most convention committees worked from the provisions of
the 1921 Constitution in drafting new articles, and thus produced a
document that evolved from current state law and experience, the
Committee on the Bill of Rights and Elections worked from existing
federal rights guarantees in drafting most of its proposals, and pro-
duced a document that has as its primary background the federal
standards in the area.
The following commentary on each section of the new declara-
tion of rights is not an exhaustive exposition; it is a selective cata-
logue of the major changes, accompanied by a discussion of the prob-
lems those changes may raise.
PREAMBLE
We, the people of Louisiana, grateful to Almighty God for the
civil, political, economic, and religious liberties we enjoy, and
desiring to protect individual rights to life, liberty, and property;
afford opportunity for the fullest development of the individual;
assure equality of rights; -promote the health, safety, education,
and welfare of the people; maintain a representative and orderly
government; ensure domestic tranquility; provide for the com-
mon defense; and secure the blessings of freedom and justice to
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitu-
tion.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Co-ordinator of legal
research for the Constitutional Convention of 1973, conducting research for the Com-
mittee on the Bill of Rights and Elections. While this article is based in part on the
author's experiences in that position, it is not an official statement or commentary of
the convention or of the committee. The opinions and statements are solely those of
the author.
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The preamble is but a preface, an introduction to the Constitu-
tion, and not a binding grant or limitation of power. It speaks in
generalities about the hopes and aspirations of the Committee on Bill
of Rights and Elections that drafted it, and of the convention that
adopted it. During committee debates, it was referred to as "a hom-
ily-it's motherhood and apple pie and all those things,"' and an
expression of aspiration.' In presenting the preamble to the conven-
tion, Committee Chairman Alphonse Jackson called it "a philosophi-
cal sermon" and explained, "My statement was based on prior court
decisions and this was discussed at length and fully in the committee.
And based on the court decisions that we considered, we make the
statement that no Preamble has the force of law."3
In view of the limited effect of the preamble, it is surprising that
the convention devoted so much time to it. However, it became in-
volved in a preliminary skirmish to test the strength of opposing
views that would clash more intensely in the debate on the more
controversial sections of the declaration of rights. The preamble thus
inspired a debate about political philosophy between those favoring
greater protection of individual liberties and more government social
action and the more traditional groups who wanted little expansion
of the 1921 Bill of Rights and no reference to social aspirations.
The committee proposed a preamble, similar to that of the Illi-
nois Constitution of 1970, which enlarged the simple preamble of the
1921 Constitution to include references to "individual rights to life,
liberty and property," "fullest development of the individual,"
"equality of rights," and "the health, safety, education, and welfare
of the people." As such, the proposal represented the aspirations of
the more liberal forces. On the convention floor, supporters of the
committee's preamble defeated three attempts to amend the pro-
posal to delete some of the new statements and the preamble as
proposed by the committee was adopted.' This vote set the pattern
1. Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, March 18, 1973, at 8-A, col. 4.
2. Baton Rouge State Times, June 14, 1973, at 16-B, col. 2.
3. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS
Aug. 28, 1973 at 52 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. The reference to court deci-
sions was to Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905), where the United
States Supreme Court citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 462 (1883), reasoned that the preamble of the United States Constitu-
tion "has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the
Government of the United States or on any of its departments."
4. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973 OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, Aug. 28, 1973 at 6, 7 [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL].
Defeat of an amendment to change the preamble in favor of a much shorter statement
was also the beginning of the defeat of an attempt by a number of delegates to scrap
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for final convention action-adoption of a Bill of Rights greatly ex-
panding the rights of the individual.
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF GOVERNMENT
Section 1. All government, of right, originates with the peo-
ple, is founded on their will alone, and is instituted to protect the
rights of the individual and for the good of the whole. Its only
legitimate ends are to secure justice for all, preserve peace, pro-
tect the rights, and promote the happiness and general welfare
of the people. The rights enumerated in this Article are inaliena-
ble by the state and shall be preserved inviolate by the state.
Section 1 is basically a second preamble, a statement of political
theory rather than of law. Elimination of the section would not di-
minish the enforceable rights of citizens. To provide that the gov-
ernment's legitimate ends concern justice, peace, rights, happiness
and general welfare is to speak vaguely enough to authorize just
about anything-which would be the case if the section were de-
leted, since states are units possessing general sovereignty and the
power to do anything not forbidden by the constitution.
That the section is in the constitution is best explained by the
fact that it is a continuation, with minor change, of the first section
of the Constitution of 1921. One can expect the same dearth of litiga-
tion under the new section as under the prior section.'
Among the additions to the 1921 provision suggested by the com-
mittee was the third sentence providing that the rights enumerated
in the bill of rights are "inalienable and shall be preserved inviol-
ate."7 To more clearly indicate that this new sentence would not
prevent an individual from waiving his rights, an amendment was
the committee proposal and adopt a Bill of Rights that deviated little from the 1921
Bill of Rights. Delegate John Thistlethwaite had appeared before the committee to
inform it that he and a group of delegates would propose floor amendments to replace
its proposal with essentially the 1921 Bill of Rights with style changes. The amendment
to change the preamble, the first step in the strategy, was defeated 46-58. See Baton
Rouge State Times, Aug. 22, 1973, at 4-A, col. 1; JOURNAL, Aug. 28 at 6.
5. See Baton Rouge State Times, April 16, 1973, at 1-A, col. 7. Presenting the
section to the delegates on behalf of the committee, Delegate Judy Dunlap pointed out
the section is "designed to set the tune and tone of the entire Declaration of Rights."
She added, "let's pass this section as is, and get onto something more juicy, namely,
Section 3." PROCEEDINGS, August 29 at 2.
6. The prior provision was invoked by plaintiffs contesting the validity of the new
constitution. As would be expected, the provision was not considered determinative
by the Louisiana supreme court. Bates v. Edwards, 294 So. 2d 532, 535 (La. 1974).
7. Committee Proposal 25, § 1 in CALENDAR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1973 OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA [hereinafter cited as Committee Proposal].
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adopted by the convention to provide that the rights "are inalienable
by the state and shall be preserved inviolate by the state."'
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Section 2. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, except by due process of law.
The due process guarantee continues the language of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
of Article I, § 2 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution. It remains a
flexible provision which gives the courts significant leeway in devel-
oping standards of reasonableness and fundamental fairness to check
government action according to evolving conceptions of society. A
separate Section 4 provides specific guarantees against expropriation.
In the evolution of the committee proposal and in the floor de-
bate, the scope and nature of due process were understood not solely
in terms of state jurisprudence under the prior due process clause, but
also in light of much broader federal due process developments. What
was sought to be continued-"the current status of the law"-was the
case law as developed by both federal and state jurisprudence and the
"fundamental fairness" analysis by which due process grows organi-
cally.
The aim of the committee proposal in protecting "other rights"
in addition to life, liberty, and property, and in referring to
"substantive and procedural due process" instead of simply to due
process I was to reflect court constructions of the classic language"0
as well as to recast the provision in clearer language rather than solely
in terms of art. Explaining the proposed section to the convention on
behalf of the committee, Delegate Kendall Vick states, "We are doing
nothing more than reflecting the current status of the law."" His
8. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 56.
9. Committee Proposal 25, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
property, or other rights without substantive and procedural due process of law."
10. Louisiana courts have included "other rights" in a broad construction of
"property". See, e.g., La. State Bar Assn. v. Ehmig, 277 So. 2d 137 (La. 1973) (license
to practice law); Mongogna v. O'Dwyer, 204 La. 829, 16 So. 2d 829 (1943) (business
alleged to be gambling operation); National Acceptance Co. of America v. Wallace,
194 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967) (rights of pledgee of promissory note). These
cases dealt with procedural due process. For substantive due process, see, e.g., Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Louisiana Bd. of Alcoholic Bey. Control, 216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248
(1949). See also New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 192 So. 523
(1939); State v. Legendre, 138 La. 154, 70 So. 70 (1915); Davis v. Department of Pub.
Safety, 262 So. 2d 541 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972),
11. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 6. At that point, Delegate Moise Dennery said, "But
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elaboration that the guarantee is one of "fundamental fairness" came
from Justice Cardozo's classic formulation in Palko v. Connecticut."2
The debate that followed did not question the nature of due
process as fundamental fairness determined by the courts, but cen-
tered on a narrow discussion of the serious spring floods which had
recently occurred and the fear of some delegates that "procedural due
process" would hamper immediate relocation of levees in times of
emergency.' 3 Explaining his amendment to delete the new phrases
and to return to the prior language, Delegate Chalin Perez argued
that "procedural due process" might require prior hearing before
appropriation; thus, government might be unable to respond quickly
in time of flood emergency. 4 The amendment was adopted, thus
returning to the prior formula for expressing the due process guaran-
tee without reference to "other rights" and "substantive and proce-
dural" due process. This action makes it clear that due process is not
violated when land is appropriated without prior hearing in times of
flood emergency. Otherwise, the section continues the terms of art
with their federal and state judicial encrustations. 5 Deletion of
"other rights" in this section is of little consequence since Section 24
recognizes the existence of "other rights retained by the individual
citizens of the state."
The committee proposal omitted the language of the prior consti-
tution providing, "nor shall vested rights be divested, unless for pur-
poses of public utility, and for just and adequate compensation pre-
viously paid."'" This was not a substantive change, for the "other
rights" language in the proposed Section 2 and Section 24 encom-
passed vested rights. Deletion of "other rights" in Section 2 by the
convention was done largely in the debate over the implications of
"procedural due process" with little discussion about the "other
rights" provision and with the purpose of keeping the law as it then
existed. Since the existing law encompasses a broad construction of
"life, liberty or property," under both federal and state constitutions,
vested rights are included in that formula,'7 as well as in Section 24.
I say if you have due process, that would automatically include substantive and proce-
dural due process." Id.
1.2. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 5.
13. The fear was probably not well founded. See, e.g., United States v. General
Box Co., 224 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 159 (1956).
14. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 24.
15. Staff Memo No. 46, Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, June 7, 1973
(unpublished).
16. La. Const. art. IV, § 15 (1921).
17. E.g., Angle v. Chicago, St. P. & Omaha Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).
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Convention action in strengthening the protection of private property
in Section 4 also supports the view that the convention was not grant-
ing less protection to vested rights from governmental taking than
currently exists.
RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
Section 3. No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of
race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbi-
trarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a per-
son because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude
are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
Louisiana's statement of the equal protection guarantee moves
the state from a position of having no equal protection clause in its
constitution"5 to that of going beyond the decisional law construing
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In
fact, the convention produced a stronger guarantee of equality with
respect to race and religion than the Committee on the Bill of Rights
and Elections proposed. 9 As with Section 2, the committee and the
convention worked from a background of federal equal protection
developments rather than from the sparsely-developed state juris-
prudence. The equal protection guarantee that emerged is a broad
one and was intended to be so. Surely the breadth of the provision
will produce far-reaching changes in the state, perhaps more than
with any other provision of the constitution.
The equal protection guarantee is directed against governmental
action. The reference is to "equal protection of the laws" and to "no
law."29 Private action is reached, however, by the slavery and invol-
untary servitude clause in the last sentence, as well as by Section 12.
The provision is long, perhaps unnecessarily so, but the conven-
tion rejected the cleaner approach of paraphrasing the fourteenth
amendment and providing simply that no person shall be denied
18. Though the 1921 Constitution had no equal protection clause, some measure
of equal protection was required by virtue of substantive due process. See Simmons v.
City of Shreveport, 221 La. 902, 60 So. 2d 867 (1952).
19. Committee Proposal 25, § 3 provided: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws nor shall any law discriminate against a person in the exercise
of rights on account of birth, race, age, sex, social origin, physical condition, or political
or religious ideas. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter
case as a punishment for crime."
20. See PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 60.
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equal protection of the laws." Rather than leaving the development
of the forbidden classifications solely to the courts, the choice was
made to list a number of discriminatory bases which are prohibited:
race; religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations; birth; age; sex; culture;
physical condition; political ideas or affiliations. This was done
partly to firmly establish protection against discrimination on those
grounds22 and partly based on political considerations, to ensure some
minorities of protection by the use of clear language instead of de-
pending on the legal construction of terms of art. 3
The decision to list specific grounds, however, does not mean the
listing is exclusive, for the first sentence provides the general rule,
''no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." This
paraphrase of the fourteenth amendment gives the courts the basis
for developing the equal protection guarantee with respect to types
of discrimination other than those listed. Had the grounds for dis-
crimination in the second and third sentences been meant to be ex-
clusive, those sentences would have stood alone, and the first sent-
ence would have been superfluous.24
As envisioned by the committee and explained on the convention
floor, the proposal was susceptible of the equal protection analysis
currently used by the United States Supreme Court-forbidding un-
reasonable classifications that do not have the support of a rational
basis or, in some cases, a compelling state interest, but allowing
21. An amendment to substitute for the committee proposal the language "[n]o
person shall be denied equal protection of the laws" was defeated 51-66. JOURNAL,
August 29 at 5-6.
22. Committee spokesman Delegate Chris Roy explained, "It's been too many
times that even the Supreme Court of the United States had dodged the issue with
respect to equal protection. We want to make sure that our justices can clearly under-
stand that when you're going to discriminate, when the state will discriminate against
a person for any of these categories, then the state must show a reasonable basis for
it. We consider that even for physical condition." PROCEEDINGS, August 29 at 61.
23. Speaking against the amendment to omit the listing of grounds of discrimina-
tion, Delegate Camille Gravel said, "it doesn't do a whole lot of good to go to people
who have been disadvantaged over the years, by circumstance and by the operation of
law, and say to them that we have got a great high sounding platitude here, the concept
of equal protection of the laws that is going to take care of the problems that you are
primarily concerned with. If we do nothing less, we have got to clearly, concisely and
specifically state in this constitution that there shall be no discrimination against those
who have been discriminated against; and if we don't spell it out, if we try to gloss it
over, if we try to generalize, then people are going to say, 'the delegates to the constitu-
tional convention are trying to play the same old games and are trying to fool us again.'
[A] few more words . . . 'is going to mean more to more people throughout the
State of Louisiana than any other provision that is going to be adopted by this constitu-
tion.'" PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 95.
24. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 61.
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classifications that are reasonable. 5 The proposal as drafted by the
committee would have applied this equal protection analysis to all
types of discrimination. However, as amended and finally adopted,
the provision does not allow the traditional analysis with respect to
race and religion. The second sentence (which uses absolute lan-
guage) in comparison with the third sentence (which employs the
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable formula) permits no discrimi-
nation whatsoever with respect to race or religion.
The amendment making the change resulted from an overnight
compromise that was adopted after debate disclosed a fear that pro-
hibition of age and sex discrimination might be too far-reaching. The
compromise amendment sought to allay some of those fears and spe-
cifically added the arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rubric to the
grounds listed in the third sentence. The author made clear, however,
that the prohibition of discrimination because of race or religious
ideas, beliefs or affiliations was absolute."
Classifications based on birth, age, sex, culture, physical condi-
tion, or political ideas or affiliations are permissible if not arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. The disjunctive "or"is used, indicating a
more rigorous scrutiny than if the conjunctive "and" had been used.
In speaking of this test, the author spoke primarily in terms of reason-
ableness,z just as the earlier explanation of the equal protection anal-
ysis was phrased primarily in terms of reasonableness." This stan-
dard is probably best understood in light of the federal equal protec-
tion analysis which provided the background for the debate. It is also
clear that the guarantee as applied to non-specific grounds of classifi-
cation (e.g., wealth), under the first sentence would also be subject
to the classic equal protection analysis." It would be better to use
that same analysis for the listed grounds in the third sentence than
to complicate matters with a different level of scrutiny for those
grounds of discrimination. In any event, the burden of justifying a
classification will be on the state, and discriminatory laws are de-
prived of a presumption of constitutionality
°
.
3
25. See Id. at 58 where Delegate Chris Roy explained on behalf of the committee,
"It does not mean that no law may be enacted which treats those categories equally
[sic], but that all laws must be reasonable with respect to any discrimination imposed
upon any person of this great state." See also id. at 64: "No, the Federal Constitution
of equal protection is the same as this, only we have specified some of the categories."
26. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 3.
27. Id.
28. See notes 4, 7 supra.
29. Id.
30. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 58, 59, 62.
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Some guidance as to discriminations that might be reasonable
comes from the author's statements to the convention as to what he
envisioned as reasonable: with respect to age-driver's license and
retirement age requirements;" sex-separate restrooms for females
and males; culture-English as the official language; physical condi-
tion-driver's license and job requirements; political ideas-party
primaries.3 1
In any event, Louisiana has launched a long range inquiry into
the rational state interests, the compelling state interests, and the
reasonableness of all legislative classifications. In the future, evolving
standards of society as developed by the courts of the state will have
to be taken into account along with those applied in development of
federal standards. The background of the provision indicates that a
grudging application of the guarantee is not warranted. Rather, an
expansive application independent of, and, in some instances, be-
yond the federal standards is suggested. 31
The reference to birth encompasses prohibition of discrimination
against illegitimate children.3 Age discrimination will need to be
tempered with the conception, supported by the debate, that the
young and the old can be given preferential treatment. 5 The mention
of sex is clearly designed to establish equal rights for women, reflect-
ing a subject that was of intense interest in committee. Culture is
to be understood in terms of certain identifiable minority groups not
being discriminated against because they choose, as Article XII, § 4
allows them, to "preserve, foster, and promote their respective his-
toric, linguistic and cultural origins."37 Physicial condition responds
31. Cf. LA. CONST. art. V, § 23(B) (mandatory retirement of judges).
32. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 3.
33. Id., Aug. 29 at 58, where Delegate Roy stated: "First, the federal courts have
failed to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to all of these classes. Thus, millions have
been, are now, and will continue to be denied equal protection of our laws. Second,
we believe that our great state should lead our own citizens to a body politic in which
we recognize the sacredness of the individual without the necessity of federal interven-
tion, and that our great courts should interpret our new ideals of equal protection."
34. Id. at 62-63.
35. Id. at 61, 63, 70.
36. Id. at 71-72, 94. See also Baton Rouge State Times, March 17, 1973, at 1-B,
col. 2; March 19, 1973, at 7-C, col. 1; April 7, 1973, at 5-A, col. 5; April 26, 1973, at 9-
A, col. 1; May 12, 1973, at 12-A, col. 1; Aug. 21, 1973, at 1-A, col. 8; Aug. 27, 1973, at
6-A, col. 6.
37. The impetus for inclusion of culture was a group of Francophiles interested
in protecting the Louisiana French heritage and the French language. The relationship
of "culture" as used here to the specification of the cultural rights in Article XII, § 4
is indicated by the amendment changing the original language of the committee from
"social origin" to "culture."
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to a number of handicapped individuals who lobbied at the conven-
tion for assistance.3 1 Political ideas or affiliations refers to basic rights
to freedom of beliefs and associations with respect to government.
The final provision of the section prohibiting slavery and invol-
untary servitude is new to the Louisiana Constitution, coming of
course from the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. As written, it does not prohibit forced labor as a punishment
for crime. The provision comes from the federal law with its judicial
constructions, which also forbids peonage laws.3" Involuntary servi-
tude refers, of course, to forced labor services, not to the types of real
rights of servitude provided for in the Civil Code which do not require
such forced labor.
The last sentence is separate from the "no law" formula of the
rest of the article; hence, the provision reaches private as well as
government action. The "badges and incidents of slavery" are also
prohibited. In addition to Section 12 which reaches private discrimi-
nation in public accommodations access, the final sentence prohibits
the type of individual, as well as governmental, discrimination that
exists as a vestige of the institution of slavery."
RIGHT TO PROPERTY
Section 4. Every person has the right to acquire, own, con-
trol, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This
right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the rea-
sonable exercise of the police power.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its
political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just
38. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 61.
39. E.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
40. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Early in its delibera-
tions, the committee accepted with little debate a proposal to include language that
would have prevented racial and sexual quotas. Though this language was not incorpo-
rated in the final committee proposal, the comments indicated an intention to prohibit
"forced segregation and to outlaw new forms of 'reverse discrimination' such as the
imposition of quotas." JOURNAL, July 6 at 3; See Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, June
10, 1973, at 2-A, col. 2.
At one point, it was envisioned that the convention would adopt official comments
to the constitution, but this was not done. In some instances, the substance of the
comments was referred to in the debates, adding to their authority. However, there
was little debate on the convention floor on the subject of quotas. Further weakening
the force of the comment is the fact that the committee proposal was changed by the
convention and that the convention rejected a similar proviso to Section 12 that would
have specified that the section should not be construed to prohibit freedom of associa-
tion. See PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 8-11.
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compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity
authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and neces-
sary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in
such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary
shall be a judicial question. In every expropriation, a party has
the right to trial by jury to determine compensation, and the
owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss. No
business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the
purpose of operating that enterprise or halting competition with
a government enterprise. However, a municipality may expropri-
ate a utility within its jurisdiction. Personal effects, other than
contraband, shall never be taken.
This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property
necessary for levee and levee drainage purposes.
Protection of property rights continues to be detailed at some
length in an article apart from the guarantee against deprivation of
property without due process.4' Section 4 resulted from an extended
debate, resolved only toward the end of the consideration of the Bill
of Rights, upon reconsideration and modification of a provision that
had been adopted earlier in the debate.2
Opening the section is a paragraph, changed little from the com-
mittee proposal,43 that serves as a general recognition of an individ-
ual's right to own property" and an indication that ownership in-
cludes control, use, enjoyment, protection and disposition. Propo-
nents of this statement thought the former constitution did not re-
quire a private property system with sufficient specificity and wanted
to prevent laws that would eliminate the concept of private property.
The author of the provision, Delegate Louis Jenkins, told the conven-
tion:
That means simply this. It does not mean that a person has
41. See La. Const., art. I, § 2; art. III, § 37; art. IV, § 15; art. VI, §§ 19, 19.1 (1921).
42. Initial adoption by one vote beyond the necessary 67 votes for adoption of a
section followed consideration of 15 amendments and 10 roll call votes. JOURNAL, Aug.
30 at 2-12. The section was reconsidered and modified two weeks later. Id., Sept. 13
at 6.
43. The language of Committee Proposal 25, § 4 was: "Every person has the right
to acquire by voluntary means, to own, to control, to enjoy, to protect, and to dispose
of private property. This right is subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power
and to the law of forced heirship."
44. Arguably, Section 3 (preventing deprivation of property) and Section 4 (pro-
hibiting the taking or damaging of property) do not explicitly recognize the right of a
person to acquire and to own property.
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a right with regard to any given piece of property; to dispose of
it, or own it, or enjoy it. But that he has that general right, that
the right, say, to own property cannot be a right which is taken
away from him.4 5
The pedigree of the provision also displays its due process roots:
The first sentence of the section contains language parallel-
ing that used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp., . . . in upholding a right to property by virtue of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Similar provisions are contained in the California,
Colorado, and Nevada Constitutions and the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights."
Thus, the language recognizes generally a right to property and func-
tions as a due process clause of sorts, giving the courts flexibility in
determining the scope of property rights with regard to matters not
explicitly covered in the remaining parts of the section. This view is
confirmed by the second sentence of the provision which states that
the right is subject to "reasonable statutory restrictions and the rea-
sonable exercise of the police power."
The explicit statement that the right to property is subject to
these reasonable restrictions was part of the original committee pro-
posal" and was adopted after objections from some who feared that
the right to "acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose
of private property" might prohibit a large number of long-
established limitations on the use of property, including zoning regu-
lations, land use planning and the Civil Code obligations of good
neighborhood. Such restrictions on the rights of property are permit-
ted if they are "reasonable" as determined by the courts in the exer-
cise of the judicial review power. The background of the provision
indicates an understanding that the statutory limitations and police
power regulations are to be given a broad ambit. The author of the
provision, responding to a question as to whether land use regulation,
environmental controls and zoning would be permitted, said: "This
does not affect it at all. In fact, this specifically grants it, whereas it
was never granted before specifically, because zoning is an exercise
of the police power, and so is land use planning."" He described the
45. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 7.
46. Comments to Committee Proposal 2, § 4, in JOURNAL, July 6 at 3. See CALIF.
CONST. art. I, § 14 (1876); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1876), NEV. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1864).
47. See note 43 supra.
48. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 20 at 12.
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police power as "the authority of the state to do virtually anything
in furtherance of the common welfare in the nature of regulation of
property, so long as property rights are not denied entirely."'" The
exception would seem to permit state regulation to prohibit discrimi-
nation in the sale and rental of property by individuals. 0
The committee proposal also specified that the right of property
was subject to the laws of forced heirship.5' This language was deleted
by amendment, primarily as a procedural device to allow for a full
independent debate on forced heirship.52 That debate was resolved by
the adoption of Article XII, § 5 which prohibits the abolition of forced
heirship and thus not only permits, but requires, forced heirship as a
limitation on the right to dispose of property.
The remainder of the section deals with expropriation in contrast
to the first paragraph's concern with regulation. It limits expropria-
tion more than the prior constitution, though it allows continuation,
by virtue of the third paragraph, of the long-established doctrine of
"appropriation" of riparian land for levee purposes without compen-
sation, as established by the levee servitude of the Civil Code.5 The
committee proposal had sought to abolish such appropriations with-
out full compensation, 4 but the convention quickly adopted an
amendment to exempt appropriation for levees from the require-
ments of the section.55 The language of the exception makes the guar-
antees of the section inapplicable to "appropriation of property nec-
essary for levee and levee drainage purposes." Use of "necessary"
reflects existing jurisprudence:
Under the existing law and jurisprudence in order to exercise
the riparian servitude, the use must be necessary to flood control
along the banks so the word 'necessary' does not make any change
in the existing jurisprudence."
49. Id. at 7.
50. Committee Proposal 25, § 7 contained a provision, ultimately rejected by the
convention, that prohibited private discrimination "in the sale or rental of property."
This was part of the same proposal which included the right to property as Section 4.
Asked how these could co-exist, the author indicated that Section 7 was the more
specific provision and would prevail, and further indicated that such regulation was a
reasonable exercise of the police power. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 10.
51. See note 43 supra.
52. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 26.
53. LA. Civ. CODE art. 665.
54. Comments to Committee Proposal 2, § 4, in JOURNAL, July 6 at 3.
55. JOURNAL, Aug. 30 at 9.
56. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 55. The quotation is of Delegate Walter Lanier, lead
author of the final compromise proposal.
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Omitted from the new constitution are the provisions of Article XVI,
§ 6 of the 1921 Constitution which granted compensation equal to the
assessed value of land actually used or destroyed for levee purposes
in the exercise of the levee servitude. However, until the legislature
acts to provide otherwise, that section remains in effect as a statute
by virtue of Article XIV, § 16(12). It is open for the legislature to
adopt legislation providing no compensation, or whatever compensa-
tion it might see fit to grant. Nothing prohibits granting compensa-
tion to the full extent of the loss. Also open for legislative action
would be procedures to regulate such appropriations. Debate on the
due process section indicates, however, that it is not constitutionally
required that a hearing prior to appropriation be held in cases of
emergency.57
In all expropriation proceedings, whether the taking is by a pub-
lic agency or a private entity, either party has a right to a trial by
jury to determine compensation due." As proposed by the committee,
it was the "owner" of the property being taken who had this right;59
the final proposal, however, refers to "a party," meaning any party
to the proceeding, necessarily including the expropriating entity.
Since the right to a jury trial can be waived, 0 the initial committee
proposal would have been to the advantage of the landowner in all
cases, since he alone had the option to demand a jury trial or a judge
trial depending on his evaluation of the circumstances. As finally
adopted, the private landowner could be put at a disadvantage if the
state demanded a jury trial in an expropriation for a popular public
project in an area."
57. See notes 14, 15 supra.
58. Jury trials were used in expropriation proceedings prior to 1948. See LA. R.S.
19:4 (1950).
59. Committee Proposal 25, § 4 provided in part: "The owner shall be compen-
sated to the full extent of his loss and has the right to a trial by jury to determine such
compensation."
60. One concludes that the right can be waived because it is expressed as being
granted to the parties rather than being a mandatory requirement and by virtue of
amendments to Section 1 to clearly allow waiver of rights. See text accompanying notes
7-8 supra.
61. See the letter of June 6, 1973, by the East Baton Rouge Parish Attorney to
the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, and attached memorandum which
stated: "[T]he popularity of the project, as well as the popularity of the individual
resisting an expropriation, will frequently be reflected in the amount of compensation
awarded. This could operate either in favor of the project or in favor of the individual.
The effect of an occasional large award in favor of the individual would not be nearly
so damaging as a small award to an owner in an unpopular position. Perhaps the most
damaging effect would be the increased costs of litigation-estimated to be somewhere
between $1,000 and $1,500 per case."
[Vol. 35
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Jury awards of compensation, like all jury determinations, con-
tinue to be subject to appellate review of facts. The committee pro-
posal to forbid appellate review of facts was defeated by the conven-
tion,6 12 which instead continued such review in civil cases. 3
The right to a jury applies in "every expropriation." It follows
that the legislature may not establish either a minimum amount in
controversy or other threshold requirements to preclude jury trial in
some instances. The right is to a "trial by jury to determine compen-
sation." Hence, the jury need not be granted the power to determine
whether takings are for a public or necessary purpose. Legislation
could leave this question, as well as others, to the judge alone.
The history of Section 4 reveals a desire to increase the level of
compensation beyond that provided by existing state law. The
change from the 1921 Constitution's language ("just and adequate
compensation") 4 to the new phrase ("compensated to the full extent
of his loss")65 was deliberate, prompted by a belief on the part of the
sponsors that inadequate awards have been provided under existing
law. The new formula comes from the 1972 Montana Constitution,"
and was stated by the committee in comments as "intended to permit
the owner whose property has been taken to remain in equivalent
financial circumstances after the taking." 7 This level of compensa-
tion applies "in every expropriation," whether by public agencies or
private persons.
The change is far reaching. Explaining his proposal, Delegate
Louis Jenkins indicated it would even extend to costs of litigation and
attorney fees: "[A]nd even if you win, you are going to lose, because
of the cost of going to court, hiring an attorney, which you'll have to
pay. So this would attempt to take into account that fact." 6 The
author, too, was insistent on using the term "extent of his loss,"
rather the "the loss" to indicate that consideration be given to an
62. Committee Proposal 25, § 8. See JOURNAL, Sept. 5 at 7. See also PROCEEDINGS,
Sept. 14 at 32, 44.
63. LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 5(C), 10(B).
64. La. Const. art. I, § 2; art. I, § 37; art. IV, § 15 (1921).
65. Though the term "just compensation" is used twice in the first two sentences
of the second paragraph of the section, it is used there not to establish the level of
compensation, but to indicate that it may be paid into the court for the owner's benefit
in the case of expropriation by public agencies but not in case of expropriation by
private entities. It is the third sentence which specifically establishes the amount of
compensation to be paid, and it is there that the formula "full extent of his loss" is
used.
66. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29 (1972).
67. JOURNAL, July 6 at 3.
68. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 8.
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owner's subjective intangible losses rather than only to objective de-
terminations. The words, "[tihe full extent of his loss" were in the
original committee proposal and were continued in the final compro-
mise. Explaining the impact of the compromise, the author, Delegate
Walter Lanier, indicated that the original breadth of the formula was
to be continued. He referred also to "things which, perhaps, in the
past may have been considered damnum absque injuria, such as the
cost of removal and things like that .... 
The debate also indicates an understanding that the formula
would cover moving costs and the cost of re-establishing a business
whose premises had been taken.70 At one point, the convention
adopted an amendment requiring consideration of loss of aesthetic or
historical values in locating public projects.7 Though this provision
was not included in the final compromise language, it again displays
the breadth of the provision. Giving the people more rights in this
regard certainly was the aim.7" In any event, the convention debate
tends to confirm the committee's concept of full compensation as
putting one "in equivalent financial circumstances after the taking,"
including items not compensable under existing law. No doubt this
provision will spawn much litigation, but it is clear that the level of
expropriation awards must be expanded to include moving expenses,
business losses because of change of location, and compensation for
some intangible losses not covered under prior law. Acceptance of
such a radical and expensive concept in the state's law may be partly
explained by the experience of many of the delegates under recent
federal legislation which had greatly increased the required payments
in case of expropriations paid with federal funds.73
Changing the justification for exercise of the eminent domain
power from the existing constitutional language ("for public pur-
poses" and "purposes of public utility")7" to a higher standard ("a
public and necessary purpose") provoked intense controversy. It was
only resolved by the final compromise provision which applied the
higher standard to takings by private entities75 but continued the old
standard to takings by public agencies.7"
69. Id., Sept. 13 at 56.
70. Id. at 57.
71. JOURNAL, Aug. 30 at 8.
72. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 58.
73. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1971).
74. La. Const. art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 15 (1921).
75. "This is intended to apply to private persons, to private corporations and to
quasi-public corporations or persons such as public utilities." Delegate Walter Lanier
explaining the final compromise proposal in PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 54.
76. "In other words, this is intended to apply to all state agencies and all political
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As proposed by the committee, all expropriations would be al-
lowed only for "a public and necessary purpose." The deliberate aim
was to make expropriation more difficult, this intent being confirmed
by the final sentence of the proposal which provided, "The issue of
whether the contemplated purpose be public and necessary shall be
a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any
legislative assertion." The aim of this last sentence was to leave the
question to the courts to determine, without the aid of a presumption
of constitutionality attached to a legislative assertion, that a certain
purpose was public and necessary.
Early in the debate, the author explained "public and necessary
purpose" by reference to Black's Law Dictionary: "The next sentence
is most important, however. 'In eminent domain proceedings, it
means land reasonably requisite and proper to accomplishing an end
in view, not absolute necessity of particular location.' Reasonably
requisite and proper, and that's what the word 'necessary' means
here."7 7 Thus it seems that the new standard results in a test that,
although not requiring absolute necessity, demands a higher stan-
dard of public interest in a project than the former test.7 1
As stated, the new standard applies only to takings by private
entities. The public purpose standard of the old constitution remains
in effect with respect to takings by "the state or its political subdivi-
sions. 7 9 Also, only private entities are subject to the provision that
"in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary
shall be a judicial question." The old standard of review remains for
public takings.
Statutes allowing "quick-taking" by public agencies are permit-
subdivisions of the state. This is the parishes, municipalities, special districts, etc."
Id. See also LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44(2).
77. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 8.
78. Though Article HI, § 37 of the 1921 Constitution which provided for takings
for private rights of way was not continued, Civil Code articles 699-702 providing for
such necessary servitudes will continue to operate since such purposes would meet the
public and necessary standard. Staff Memorandum 47 of June 7, 1973, to the Commit-
tee on Bill of Rights and Elections (unpublished).
79. Delegate Walter Lanier: "We feel that the present jurisprudence under the law
defining public purposes adequately covers this point, and to put in 'necessary' at this
particular point would really interject a tremendous burden. PROCEEDINGS, Sept.
13 at 54.
80. Referring to this part of the provision in the final compromise, Lanier said:
"Now this is not intended to preclude the legislature from passing a statute saying 'in
the following cases these are public purposes for which there can be expropriation by
private entities.' But such a list would be illustrative and would not prohibit review
by the court of the question of whether or not this was a public or a necessary purpose."
PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 55.
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ted by this section."' Quick-taking refers to an expropriation proce-
dure by which ex parte orders prior to judgment transfer ownership
provided that the taker deposit with the court funds equal to apprais-
als made by the taker. 2 The ambit of such quick-takings may be
increased since they no longer are limited to takings for highway
purposes. 3 Such statutes are not permissible for takings by private
entities, however.
Quick-takings are permitted by virtue of the language, used with
respect to governmental takings, that compensation be "paid to the
owner or into court for his benefit." 4 In contrast, with respect to
private entities the provision requires that compensation be "paid to
the owner." In this respect, the final provision is more stringent than
the original proposal. Also, it is more internally consistent than the
committee proposal; it would have caused difficulty to allow a quick-
taking procedure by private entities and still apply the rule that
whether the taking is for a public and necessary purpose is a judicial
question.
Reference to "payment to the owner or into court for his benefit"
was not meant to restrict the class of persons who could claim com-
pensation to "owners" in a technical property law sense. The purpose
was to give citizens more rights, 5 and the term, as stated by the
author of the final compromise, "is intended to be used in its broadest
sense, in other words, a leasehold interest in land is a property right
as you and I well know, and there's been some trouble over that in
the past."86 In fact, when one couples this intent with the requirement
that compensation be to the full extent of one's loss, the purpose
emerges of giving protection to a broader category of persons than was
previously the case. It is also clear that by referring to property
"taken or damaged" compensation must be given not only when own-
ership or a real right is taken, but also when property is damaged.
This is, of course, but a continuation of the prior language. 7
The prohibition against taking "a business enterprise or any of
81. See LA. R.S. 48:441-60 (Supp. 1959).
82. Id.
83. La. Const. art. VI, § 19.1 (1921) (Added by La. Acts 1948 No. 548, adopted
Nov. 2, 1948).
84. Also, the new constitution fails to continue the requirements of the 1921 Con-
stitution which required no takings until "after just and adequate compensation is
paid," (Art. I, § 2); until "compensation be first paid," (Art. III, § 37); and without
"compensation previously paid," (Art. IV, § 15) (Emphasis added.) See State v.
Phares, 245 La. 534. 159 So. 2d 144 (1963).
85. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 58.
86. Delegate Walter Lanier, Id. at 55-56.
87. See La. Const. art. I, § 2 (1921).
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its assets . . for the purpose of operating that enterprise or halting
competition with a government enterprise" is an innovation. As
worded, the prohibition does not prevent regulation short of expropri-
ation and does not prohibit expropriation of such enterprises or assets
except for the purpose of operating them or halting competition with
government enterprise.88 An exception allows a municipality to expro-
priate a utility within its jurisdiction for the purpose of operating it
or halting competition with a government utility. As a municipality
expands its geographic limits, the added area would be "within its
jurisdiction," thus permitting expropriation of a utility or its assets
in that area.
-A final limitation is that "personal effects, other than contra-
band, shall never be taken," no matter how public or necessary the
purpose. The choice of "personal effects" rather than the technical
term "movables" was made partly to avoid importing into the consti-
tution the complexities associated with movables that become im-
movables by destination. This choice was made in the context of past
necessity to amend the consitution to allow control of billboards to
comply with federal standards for obtaining federal funds for highway
construction; such billboards should not be considered personal ef-
fects. 9
"Personal effects" was used with the knowledge that it was not
a term of art and that it was a flexible concept open to court develop-
ment. In answering a question about its meaning, the author of the
final compromise compared the expression to the word negligence
and its development on a case-by-case basis. 0 The committee com-
ments did not provide a definition; they simply gave examples: "Per-
sonal effects are intended to include money, stocks, bonds, objects of
art, books, papers, essential tools of trade, and clothing."91 "Personal
effects" as used in this section may be contrasted with use of "ef-
fects" in Section 5 protecting against unreasonable searches, seizures,
or invasions of privacy. Use of the adjective "personal" would tend
to create a narrower category.
Property considered as "contraband" is exempted from the re-
quirement that personal effects not be taken. The record provides no
88. An early version of the committee comments to the section indicated, "It is
intended that a business shall not be taken over for the purpose of operating it, al-
though presumably a business could be terminated in an orderly manner." JOURNAL,
July 6 at 3.
89. La. Const. art. VI, § 19.3 (1921) (Added by La. Acts 1966 No. 552, adopted
Nov. 8, 1966).
90. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 56.
91. JOURNAL, July 6 at 3.
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special definition of contraband. The term is used in the ordinary
sense of property the possession of which is forbidden by law. The
historical evolution of the term indicates that no compensation need
be given when goods classed as contraband are taken.2 The govern-
ment's power to classify items as contraband and to take them with-
out compensation is of course limited by the provisions that the right
to own property is subject to "reasonable" restrictions and that prop-
erty cannot be taken without due process. 3
Read literally, this prohibition against taking personal effects
would prevent taking such effects as evidence. Yet, Section 5 recog-
nizes the power to seize "things" pursuant to a reasonable search and
seizure. The history of the two sections fails to disclose a recognition
of the apparent conflict, and thus sheds little light on its proper
resolution. Perhaps Section 4 can be construed to govern generally in
the sphere of expropriation, preventing the taking of the ownership
of such items, while the more specific Section 5 could be construed
as an exception permitting the temporary detention of things to be
used as evidence in criminal proceedings, provided these things are
returned to the owner after the proceedings are completed.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, prop-
erty, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant
shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the
persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason
for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or
seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing
to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
The traditional guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures is cemented and expanded by the section. Perhaps more signifi-
cant is protection of privacy beyond the domain of criminal proce-
dure; the section establishes an affirmative right to privacy which
will also have an impact on non-criminal areas of the law. It acceler-
ates the tentative steps of Griswold v. Connecticut4 and establishes
92. E.g., State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988, 229 So. 2d 72 (1969); State v. Ricks, 215
La. 602, 41 So. 2d 232 (1949). See LA. R.S. 15:31 (Supp. 1966), as amended by La. Acts
1972, No. 130 § 1; LA. R.S. 56:507 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 53 § 9.
93. Id.
94. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court reasoned that an underlying principle of the
first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments to the constitution was the protection
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the principle of the case in explicit statement instead of depending
on reasoning from other provisions for its establishment.
This affirmative aspect is indicated by the placement of the
provision. It was deliberately placed apart from the other criminal
procedure guarantees which are grouped together in Sections i3
through 21.15 The expression "no law shall" was not used, indicating
that the protection goes beyond limiting state action." Rather, the
statement is positive and general. Furthermore, to the language of the
1921 provision ("secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures . ..")" is added protec-
tion of property and communications against unreasonable invasions
of privacy. The ancestry of the latter phrase can be traced to
Griswold's establishment of a right to privacy and to fear of unres-
trained gathering and dissemination of information on individuals
through use of computer data banks." The section will be a fertile
ground for development in tort law as well as the non-criminal as-
pects of government operations.
The key element is that the invasions of privacy must be unrea-
sonable to merit constitutional protection, and the courts are given
flexibility to determine which invasions of privacy are supported by
sufficient societal interests to be considered reasonable. In this in-
quiry, the courts are guided by the purpose of the convention in
expanding the individual's protections in this area beyond the exist-
ing law.
An early committee draft prevented wiretapping and bugging
with the statement that no law could permit the interception of
inspection of any private communication or message." The final com-
mittee proposal omitted that language, and the section as adopted
treats wiretapping and bugging as "communications" within the pro-
tection against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of pri-
of privacy. The Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which prevented use
of contraceptive devices and thus interfered with marital privacy. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. Committee Proposal 2 used a similar arrangement: Protection of privacy was
in Section 5; the criminal procedure guarantees were Section 12 through 18. See Com-
ment to Section 12, in JOURNAL, July 6 at 4.
96. Contrast Section 3's protection against discrimination from state action
("equal protection of the laws," "no law shall") with Section 12's protection against
discrimination by private action. See also use of the "no law shall" formula in Sections
7, 8, 9.
97. La. Const. art. I, § 7 (1921).
98. E.g., PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 5 at 51.
99. Baton Rouge State Times, April 20, 1973, at 10-C, col. 3.
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vacy. Such activities are allowed if reasonable and also come under
the requirements for a warrant.' °°
Article I, § 7 of the 1921 Constitution which provided that "no
such search or seizure shall be made except upon warrant" was not
construed as written and the Louisiana supreme court allowed such
searches and seizures without a warrant. 0' The new provision which
omits the prior language and instead paraphrases the federal guaran-
tee is an implied recognition of the permissibility of warrantless
searches and seizures (seizures of the person, or arrests, included) so
long as they are reasonable.0 2
Though the exclusionary rule is not explicitly stated it was con-
sidered implicit in the provision. 03 In fact, the last sentence of the
section giving standing to persons who heretofore have been denied
it in federal cases is an implicit recognition of the broadening of the
right to suppress evidence obtained in violation of constitutional
guarantees. Speaking against an amendment that would have deleted
the last sentence, Delegate Jack Avant said:
If you take this last sentence out, you take away from the law
enforcement agencies of this state the incentive that they have
to comply with constitutional safeguards before they take such
drastic measures as breaking into a private residence in the mid-
dle of the night to conduct a search and seizure because you take
away the penalty; you take away the thing that they stand to
lose; you take away the admissibility of that evidence and the
ability to use that evidence to gain a conviction.'"'
Furthermore, the debate on the section supports a desire to go
far beyond federal standards and to prevent the use of evidence ob-
tained by private persons in violation of the guarantees of the section.
Delegate Earl Schmitt said:
Up until the present time, any individual could hire a private
detective firm or by stealth, or other illegal activity . . . break
into someone's business and steal records and turn these records
100. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Federal legislation specifies standards for state statutes permitting electronic intercep-
tion of communications. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968).
101. Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 802, 812 (1966).
102. Delegate Kendall Vick, explaining the section on behalf of the committee,
described the scope of a reasonable search incident to arrest by reference to Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which limited such searches to the area in the immedi-
ate control of an arrested person. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 1 at 17.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id. at 22.
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over to the police and these records could then be used by the
police and could not be kept out of the record. They could not be
kept out on a motion to suppress. This is a very fundamental
change. . . .This change will allow the protection of the individ-
ual, not only from state action, but from the action of vigilante
committees, from the action of other groups in our society, as an
example, those who hire private detective firms to do what they
know the police cannot do legally.'
Supporting this conclusion is the first sentence of the section which
seems to provide an affirmative right of every individual and not just
a check on state action.
On the other hand, one can argue that such a far-reaching depar-
ture from existing principles was not intended. The committee com-
ments and the statements of committee representative s do not ad-
dress this point. The convention debate shows little attention to the
specific question of suppressing evidence obtained by private persons.
Further, though the first sentence in the section contemplates reach-
ing private persons by going beyond the old reference to "searches
and seizures" and adding "invasions of privacy," the last sentence of
the section, the one more closely connected to suppression of evi-
dence, refers to "a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section" and does not include a reference to "invasions of privacy."
An innovation is the expansion of the class of persons given
standing to contest improper searches and seizures and to have evi-
dence so secured excluded. The last sentence of the section abolishes
the federally developed standing requirement by which a defendant
asserting a fourth amendment objection was required to show that he
was the "victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search
was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only
through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or
seizure directed at someone else."' 6 It provides that "any person
adversely affected" has standing to raise the illegality. 7 Thus, if
evidence is obtained by an improper search or seizure, it cannot be
used against anyone whose guilt it would tend to prove and thus
practically cannot be used at all. The scope of the exclusionary rule
105. Id. at 25-26.
106. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). See Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
107. The committee comments made this clear: "in addition, persons protected
against illegal searches and seizures include not only the person whose house or prop-
erty has been illegally searched but also any other person adversely affected by the
illegal search." JOURNAL, July 6 at 3.
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is thus enlarged, with the expectation that its deterrent effect will be
increased.'08
An amendment to delete the standing provision was defeated on
the convention floor by a 37-72 vote after a debate that clearly posed
the issue. 1" It is also clear that the statement is not limited to crimi-
nal proceedings, so that any person adversely affected has standing
to bring a civil action to redress improper police conduct.
The requirement that warrants issue only with probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation and describing with particularity
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized is a
restatement of the federal standard in the area."0 These require-
ments, by their terms, apply to both search warrants and arrest war-
rants.
The innovation is the requirement that a warrant specify "the
lawful purpose or reason for the search." This applies to search war-
rants, but not to arrest warrants, for the reference is to "search" and
not to "seizure." However, a parallel provision in Section 13 requires
that a person who is detained or arrested must "be advised fully of
the reason for his arrest or detention." If this requirement of specify-
ing the lawful purpose or reason for the search is not observed, the
warrant is not in conformity with the requirements of the section, and
any person adversely affected "by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section" has standing to contest it.
The policy objective is to require what the case law has not yet
clearly required; that the person whose privacy is invaded by the
state must be told of the state's proper basis for making that invasion.
In this way, the subject of an invasion of privacy is less likely to resist
it. It also gives the person information which may be helpful in later
legal proceedings contesting the search.
The sources do not contain a definition of lawful reason or pur-
pose. Certainly, any proper warrant would have behind it a "lawful"
reason, so inquiry must center on the meaning of "reason" and "pur-
pose." Presumably, it is not required that all the facts establishing
probable cause be specified. Since the same sentence uses the expres-
sion "probable cause" in another sense, there must have been a delib-
erate choice not to use that same expression in this regard. In most
cases, the permissible reason or purpose for a search would be to
obtain a particularly described item because of its association with a
particularly enumerated crime."' Since the section also requires par-
108. See PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 1 at 15, 22.
109. Id. at 18-26.
110. Id. at 17.
111. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).
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ticularization of the item, it would seem that the additional require-
ment refers to particularization of the connection to some specific
offense. The connection can be, in the terms of article 161 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, that the thing has been the subject of a theft,
was intended for use or used as a means of committing an offense, or
may constitute evidence tending to prove the commission of an of-
fense. If possession of a certain item is itself a crime, that possession
would certainly be a lawful reason or purpose for the search. Also, if
a warrant is required for a health or building code inspection, that
would be particularized as the reason or purpose.2
Though this requirement does not apply to warrantless searches,
some fact situations may arise where it could be considered a part of
the reasonableness requirement for warrantless searches."' In a
search incident to arrest, however, the person arrested will have been
told of the reason for arrest or detention as required by Section 13;
hence, the incremental protection provided by incorporating the
reason-for-the-search requirement in such a situation may be mini-
mal and not significant enough to be incorporated in the reasonable-
ness requirement.
Continuing the expression "search and seizure" and the refer-
ence to "persons or things to be seized" indicates that the ambit of
this section includes not only searches of places and persons, but also
arrests or other detaining of persons, since existing case law considers
detention and arrest a type of seizure."' Thus this section establishes
the probable cause standards for arrests or seizures of the person, and
the standard of information required before arrest or detention. Sec-
tion 13 then comes into play to govern what must be done once the
arrest or detention is made.
t FREEDOM FROM INTRUSION
Section 6. No person shall be quartered in any house without
the consent of the owner or lawful occupant.
Though this guarantee is one that has had little development
and little impact, its continuation reflects an historical continuity
with prior constitutions, the Third Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. The changes ex-
pand the protection to encompass protection against quartering of
any person, not only a "soldier, sailor or marine" and prohibits such
112. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
113. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 802, 805 (1966).
114. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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action at all times, not just "in time of peace." Consent of the lawful
occupant is required, not just that of the owner, thus protecting les-
sees or other persons lawfully occupying any house." 5
Both the federal and state guarantees have been seldom applied.
However, the federal provision has been used as an indication of the
concern of the drafters of the Bill of Rights with individual privacy
and to buttress the development of the right tb privacy by the United
States Supreme Court.' 6 As this provision expands the right to pri-
vacy in Louisiana, it indicates the general thrust of the constitution
to provide greater individual guarantees in the closely related Section
5 and confirms the policy objectives of that section.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Section 7. No law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and pub-
lish his sentiments on any subject, but is responsible for abuse
of that freedom.
The complex and convoluted evolution of the freedom of expres-
sion guarantee, through the committee and floor debates, discloses a
dispute over form rather than substance. The guarantee is a recast
of the 1921 provision"7 with minor style changes, using traditional
terms of art to reflect the existing state of the law under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The initial aim of the committee was to express the guarantee
in clearer and more understandable language that would reflect the
current court construction of the guarantee." ' Thus, the freedoms
115. La. Const. art. XIX, § 7 (1921) provided: "No soldier, sailor or marine shall,
in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner."
116. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
117. La. Const. art. I, § 3 (1921): "No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain
the liberty of speech or of the press; any person may speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
118. See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 251-74 (1972); Staff Memorandum
No. 39, May 14, 1973 to the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections entitled "Judi-
cial Construction of the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution." See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
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would have been particularized as freedom "to speak, write, publish,
photograph, illustrate or broadcast on any subject or to gather, re-
ceive and transmit knowledge and information" with the provision
that such activities shall not be "subject to censorship, licensure,
registration, control or special taxation.""' Since the absolute lan-
guage of the First Amendment has been construed to permit regula-
tion of obscenity and defamation, originally it was thought unneces-
sary to include the statement that one is "responsible for the abuse
of that liberty." ' However, several witnesses expressed concern that
the proposal's absolute wording would prohibit such regulation."2 ' To
satisfy those objections the committee agreed to add an abuse clause
that appeared in the final proposal of the committee.' 2
On the convention floor, the committee struggled unsuccessfully
to convince the delegates that its proposal was not an innovation but
simply a restatement of existing principles developed from the first
amendment by court construction. 3 Many delegates, though accept-
ing the substantive aim of continuing existing safeguards of speech
and press, were wary of the possible uncertainty of the new wording.'
Delegate Jack Burson in explaining his amendment to replace the
committee formula with a paraphrase of the first amendment, said:
We have worlds of jurisprudence; we have legions of cases
defining what and how the freedom of speech or press should be
defined; we will know what we are talking about. I am not sure
that we will know what we are talking about if we adopt the
committee proposal." 5
He indicated that his proposal would allow organic growth of the
guarantee through court construction:
I don't think there is any question but what the freedom of
speech or press is an organically growing area just as all other
U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kan-
sas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
119. Baton Rouge State Times, April 17, 1973, at 6-A, col. 6.
120. Id.
121. Id., May 12, 1973, at 12-A, col. 1.
122. Committee Proposal 25, § 9 provided: "No law shall abridge the freedom of
every person to speak, write, publish, photograph, illustrate, or broadcast on any
subject or to gather, receive, or transmit knowledge or information, but each person
shall be responsible for the abuse of that liberty; nor shall such activities ever be
subject to censorship, licensure, registration, control, or special taxation".
123. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 5 at 42-45.
124. Id. at 47-52.
125. Id. at 47.
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areas of constitutional law. But I think, like Justice Frankfurter,
that they should be allowed to grow organically, to grow a little
bit here, a little bit there, and to be defined as they grow and that
we shouldn't strike out statutorily- not statutorily, constitution-
ally-here and set some new language in here that we really don't
know what it means. Let's let those areas continue to grow organi-
cally. '
Newspaperman Delegate John Thistlethwaite supported this view,
"We've got almost two centuries of jurisprudence behind the Burson
amendment. It tracks very closely the first amendment of the Federal
Constitution.' 21 7 Also adding to the attractiveness of the Burson
amendment was its shortness, an important consideration to a con-
vention intent on reducing the length of Louisiana's more than
250,000-word constitution. 18
Once adopted, however, the Burson amendment prompted the
earlier fears that since the provision lacked an abuse clause, it might
be considered as absolute, preventing regulation of obscenity or defa-
mation. An amendment adding the abuse clause was then adopted.'2
By this point in debate, the proposal was a simple guarantee of
freedom of press and speech with an abuse of responsibility clause,
virtually what the 1921 Constitution provided. The convention then
adopted with little debate an amendment by Delegate Harmon Drew
that tracked the prior provision more closely. 30 Finally, the conven-
tion rejected another committee attempt to particularize the guaran-
tee, '3 and also rejected an attempt to narrow the freedom of expres-
sion by establishing a right of reply to a person whose character was
assailed by the press.132
The result of this long debate is to continue the basic language
of the prior law in form and to continue the substance of existing
126. Id. at 49.
127. Id., Sept. 6 at 12.
128. Delegate J. Burton Willis said: "I do not have a mind keen enough, or a
tongue nimble enough to suggest all the consequences to which the verbosity of this
article may lead. If brevity is the soul of wit, let me suggest we be brief." Id. at 23.
See also Id. at 25.
129. Id. at 26, 27, 29.
130. Id. at 30.
131. JOURNAL, Sept. 6 at 6. The amendment would have added the sentence,
"Such activities shall never be subject to prior restraint, licensure, registration, or
special taxation."
132. Defeated by a 30-77 vote was the amendment by Delegate D'Gerolomo to
add, "Any person whose character is assailed by reason of the exercise of any freedom
herein granted shall be afforded an equal opportunity to reply, and the legislature shall
enact laws to implement this provision and provide penalties for violations." Id. at 5.
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United States Supreme Court constructions of the guarantee. Dele-
gate Burson's statement recommending that the convention allow the
law "to grow organically, to grow a little bit here, a little bit there,
and to be defined as they grow" seems to portend what the develop-
ment of the guarantee will be.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Section 8. No law shall be enacted respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The convention adopted this section repeating the guarantee of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by a 104-0
vote after little debate and with no amendments submitted to the
committee proposal. 3 The standards developed by federal jurisprud-
ence construing the article were expected to be continued. 3'
The ease with which the section passed was somewhat surpris-
ing, for it was expected that the issue of aid to religious schools would
be a controversial one in the convention, particularly in light of recent
statutes providing such aid and court decisions prohibiting it on con-
stitutional grounds. 115The provisions of the 1921 Constitution prohib-
iting aid to religious schools were quite specific and reiterated in three
separate articles. 3 All three provisions were relied on by the Louis-
iana supreme court in Seegers v. Parker"7 which held unconstitu-
tional legislation providing grants to teachers of secular subjects in
church-owned schools. Still the overriding United States Supreme
Court decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman3 " and Tilton v. Richardson"
were known and discussed and seemed to provide an acceptable solu-
tion to both sides of the issue, and the federal statement of the right
which supported those decisions was adopted."'
133. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 53-54. Debate on the section occupies a meager two
pages in the transcript of the proceedings.
134. Id. at 54. The initial committee comments to Committee Proposal 2, § 10
were simply, "Modernization of language. No substantive change." JOURNAL, July 6
at 3.
135. See Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970).
136. Art. I, § 4; Art. IV, § 8; Art. XII, § 13, as amended by La. Acts 1962, No.
544, adopted Nov. 6, 1962.
137. 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970).
138. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
139. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
140. Writing for the 4-3 majority in Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d
213 (1970), Justice Barham referred to Article I, § 4 of the 1921 Constitution as being
quite similar to the first amendment provisions on the subject and said the court would
be guided by United States Supreme Court decisions construing that amendment.
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Delegate Gerald Weiss, in introducing the committee proposal,
specifically referred to the standards of Lemon and Tilton:
[T]he court applies two guidelines, it's my understanding,
in dealing with religious and secular matters. First is, a law or
program must have a secular purpose neither advancing nor in-
hibiting religion in making decisions in this regard. Second, it
must not involve the government-federal, state or local govern-
ments-with excessive entanglement with religion. These are
decisions that have been substantiated by both the Supreme, and
as you pointed out, the Louisiana Supreme Court."'
The impact of the adoption of the proposal and the deletion of
the more explicit sections of the prior constitution is to provide a
more flexible standard with regard to government aid to religion than
was provided in the old document. The courts and the legislature
have some room to maneuver within the guidelines of having a secu-
lar purpose and avoiding excessive entanglement with religion. Also,
such aid would have to meet the test of Article VII, § 10(D) that "No
appropriation shall be made except for a public purpose."
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Section 9. No law shall impair the right of any person to
assemble peaceably or to petition government for a redress of
grievances.
Paraphrasing the first amendment and Article I, § 5 of the former
constitution,"' the section continues existing principles and the exist-
ing construction of the law established in a number of civil rights
cases which protect peaceful assemblies and petitions for redress, but
not those that are violent."' No significant dispute arose over this
language in the convention, and presumably one can expect contin-
uation of the decisions allowing governments to require reasonable
permits for large gatherings as a means of keeping order, planning for
police protection and preventing obstruction of traffic.
The convention deleted committee language that recognized the
right "to travel freely within the state, and to enter and leave the
141. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 54.
142. La. Const. art. 1, § 5 (1921): "The people have the right peaceably to assem-
ble and apply to those vested with the powers of government for a redress of grievances
by petition or remonstrance."
143. See authorities cited in B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 251-56 (1972). See
also State v. Bulot, 175 La. 21, 142 So. 787 (1932).
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state."'' The right to enter and leave the state, of course, is a feder-
ally protected right.' Questions arose over the implications of the
right to travel freely within the state; particularly whether the right
was absolute or, as the committee conceived of it, subject to reason-
able restriction. The committee had consented to the suggestion of
witnesses to add the clause, "Nothing herein shall prohibit quaran-
tines or restrict the authority of the state to supervise persons subject
to parole or probation."
This language was not sufficient to allay fears of some delegates
that the provision would hamper the law of arrest, mental health
commitments, restricting travel during hurricane emergencies, pre-
venting trespass, and the like.'46 Some delegates were concerned that
the enumeration of two exceptions in the proposal (for quarantines
and parole supervision) would lead to the construction that the enu-
meration is exclusive, thus preventing other exceptions. 7 In light of
these implications, the convention voted to delete the reference to the
right to travel.' 4s
Deletion of the specific reference to a right to travel, however,
does not mean that such a right does not exist by virtue of other provi-
sions that were adopted. The right to assemble and petition is an
implicit recognition that travel is a necessary adjunct of assembling
and petitioning. 9 Other types of travel are a "liberty" which cannot
be abridged without due process under Section 2.
RIGHT TO VOTE
Section 10. Every citizen of the state, upon reaching eighteen
years of age, shall have the right to register and vote, except that
this right may be suspended while a person is interdicted and
judicially declared mentally imcompetent or is under an order of
imprisonment for conviction of a felony.
The acceptance of the expansion of voting rights following the
144. Committee Proposal 25, § 11 provided: "No law shall impair the right of
every person to assemble peaceably, to petition government for a redress of grievances,
to travel freely within the state, and to enter and leave the state. Nothing herein shall
prohibit quarantines or restrict the authority of the state to supervise persons subject
to parole or probation."
145. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
146. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 55-67.
147. Id. at 55-57.
148. Id. at 67.
149. See note 145 supra.
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Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and 197050 and the twenty-sixth amend-
ment'' probably explains the lack of opposition to this section which
rejects the 1921 Constitution's limitations on suffrage'52 and classifies
voting as a right rather than a privilege. Gone from the state's law
are complex provisions that established residency requirements,
character and literacy tests, and a voting age of 21 years.
By the literal terms of the section, every citizen, upon reaching
the age of 18, has a right to register and vote. The legislature cannot
encumber the right to vote by establishing other qualifications. The
only times the right can be denied are enumerated in the sec-
tion-while a person is interdicted and judicially declared mentally
incompetent or is under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a
felony.
As proposed by the committee, the provision was phrased in the
negative, "No person eighteen years of age or older who is a citizen
and resident of the state shall be denied the right to register and to
vote. . . ."' " This was changed by amendment to read, "Every citi-
zen of the state, upon reaching eighteen years of age, shall have the
right to register and vote. . ."I" The author's purpose in making
the change was to prohibit the legislature from lowering the voting
age to less than 18. 151 However, the normal meaning of the words does
not seem to comport with that explanation. The legislature could
lower the voting age to 16, it seems, without violating the requirement
that every 18 year old citizen have the right to register and vote. Some
delegates indicated they could not see a difference in the language
used by the committee and that of the amendment. 5 ' It may well be
that the issue will not arise until the next generation when the con-
sensus of that society will be more persuasive than an uncertain
legislative history.
Establishing a right to register, as well as to vote, recognizes the
state's power to require registration as a prerequisite to voting. In
fact, Article XI, § 1 requires that the legislature adopt an election
code which provides "for permanent registration of voters."
In preparing its proposal, the committee was aware of the then-
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-19 73(p) (1965); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1973bb-4 (1970).
151. "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age."
152. La. Const. art. VIII, §§ 1-6 (1921).
153. Committee Proposal 25, § 19.
154. JOURNAL, Sept. 8 at 7, 8.
155. See PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 69.
156. Id. at 72, 73.
[Vol. 35
DECLARATION OF-RIGHTS
existing federal and constitutional statutory standards limiting dura-
tional residency requirements as a prerequisite to voting.157 Though
recognizing that the ambit of residency requirements was small, the
committee adopted the formula that restricted the vote to a "citizen
and resident of the state." The Landry amendment 5 " omitted "resi-
dent" and the final proposal simply refers to a person who is a "citi-
zen of the state." Thus, residency requirements as understood under
the prior constitution, particularly those which require residence in
the state for a specified time, are prohibited. A citizen of the state,
by the definition of the fourteenth amendment, is simply a citizen of
the United States who resides in Louisiana. Hence, residency in that
narrow sense remains a valid inquiry.'59
As a practical matter, it is possible for the legislature to require
registration a reasonably short time before an election is held. A
system of voter registration, which is mandated by the constitution,
assumes existence of a procedure for registering voters and preparing
lists of eligible voters for use at the election. Implicit in such a proce-
dure is the requirement of some time to prepare the needed docu-
ments, depending on the available technology.' This short period is
not a residency requirement, but rather a time necessary to imple-
ment a system of voter registration.
The committee and the convention struggled to find a formula
for providing that mental incompetents could not vote. The unsatis-
factory final committee language was adopted by the convention
after a confused debate followed by several votes that were unable to
unite the delegates on a preferable wording."6 ' Simply providing for
suspension during interdiction was thought too harsh since interdic-
tion can be based on grounds other than mental incapacity. Simply
saying that persons committed to mental institutions would be de-
nied the right was opposed because of the feeling that commitment
is too simple a procedure. In any event, the provision requires an
157. Staff Memorandum No. 28, April 30, 1973, to the Committee on Bill of Rights
and Elections (unpublished). See Voting Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973(p)
(1965); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1973bb-4 (1970). See particularly Burns v. Fortson, 410
U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
158. JOURNAL, Sept. 8 at 7-8.
159. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). See also Paulder v.
Paulder, 185 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951), where the
court said: "We take it to be well established that plaintiff was at liberty to instantly
transfer her citizenship from Texas to Arkansas and this she might do without necess-
ity and simply from choice. She had a right to select her domicile for any reason that
seemed sufficient to her."
160. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
161. See JOURNAL, Sept. 8 at 8, 9.
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interdiction as provided in the Civil Code'62 and a judicial declaration
of mental incompetence' 3 before the right to vote can be suspended.
These two requisites will hardly ever be met. The result is that some
persons confined in mental institutions will have the right to vote. It
is certainly arguable that the state cannot indirectly prevent them
from voting by denying them access to the polls because they are not
free to leave an institution. This is especially true for state mental
institutions.'"4 The problem is solvable by allowing voting at the insti-
tution, granting some measure of temporary freedom to vote at regu-
lar polling places, or providing for absentee balloting.
A similar problem arises with the provision suspending the right
to vote while a person "is under an order of imprisonment for convic-
tion of a felony." The right is not suspended as to persons awaiting
trial or imprisoned for a misdemeanor; hence, these people have the
right to vote. Again, it is difficult to see how imprisoned persons can
exercise this right unless they are allowed to vote in jail, vote by
absentee ballot, or be granted temporary liberty to vote at a regular
poll. '65
The word choice, "under an order of imprisonment," may seem
unusual; "imprisoned" would be simpler and more direct. The reason
for the choice was to overcome an objection that an escapee would
not be "imprisoned" and thus not within the exception. That choice
of words does not prevent a person on probation or parole from voting
since such a person is not under an order of imprisonment. The lan-
guage contrasts with Section 20's deliberate use of "termination of
state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense,"
where it was intended that completion of probation or parole require-
ments be met before full rights of citizenship are restored. Though the
general expression used in Section 20, "full rights of citizenship,"
normally encompasses voting rights, the more specific provision in
this article providing for return of the right to vote when one is no
longer under an order of imprisonment will prevail. In fact, under this
section, the right to vote is never taken away. It is simply suspended
while certain conditions are met. When those conditions no longer
exist, the suspension automatically ends. There is no need for any
kind of pardon or other formality before an offender regains his right
to register and vote. The same applies to incompetents; once one is
no longer under interdiction or no longer under a judicial declaration
162. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 389-426.
163. Cf. LA. R.S. 28:51-62 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 154 § 1.
164. See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
165. Id.
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of mental incompetence, the right to vote returns with no formality
required.
Requirements of single-member districts for legislators recog-
nizes the power to establish constituencies and to require that persons
vote within those constituencies. The same reasoning flows from ref-
erences to local government officials being elected within the par-
ish.'" This leads to the further recognition of the power to enact
legislation to restrict the right to vote to one place and to establish
regulations to prevent multiple voting. This section also does not
prohibit party primaries under a system that allows only party mem-
bers to vote in such primaries. In the equal protection guarantee
debate, it was clearly contemplated that such primaries are not an
unreasonable discrimination because of political ideas or beliefs.' 7
Finally, this section by its terms does not seem to prohibit limiting,
within narrow federal standards, voting on certain propositions to
landowners within special districts.'68
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMs
Section 11. The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms
shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the
passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on
the person.
A tentative committee draft of this section had continued the
reference to the militia in defining the right to keep and bear arms,'6
as in the United States Constitution7 ' and the 1921 Constitution.,
The final committee proposal omitted that reference'72 and was
adopted by the convention in this respect.'" Thus, it would seem that
166. LA. CONST. art. HI, § 1; art. VI, § 1.
167. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
168. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Stor. Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
169. Baton Rouge State Times, April 20, 1973, at 10-C, col. 4; Committee Proposal
2, § 20.
170. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend.
II.
171. "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged. This shall not prevent
the passage of laws to punish those who carry weapons concealed." La. Const. Art. I,
§ 8 (1921).
172. Committee Proposal 25, § 20: "The right of each citizen to keep and bear
arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to
prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons."
173. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 12 at 4.
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the right is established without the reference to a militia, a reference
that could have indicated that the right could be limited to participa-
tion or service in a militia.'74 Since it is a right of "each citizen," it is
clearly not a reference to a right of a state to maintain its militia as
the federal provision has been at times construed.'75 Federal regula-
tion in this area, of course, is pervasive and continues to establish
strong gun controls. 7 '
An early committee draft added the sentence, "Nothing con-
tained herein shall allow the confiscation or special taxation of
arms."' 77 It was not incorporated in the final committee proposal,'
but an attempt was made to add by floor amendment that "No law
shall require the licensing or registration or impose special taxation
on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammunition."'' 9 The
amendment was rejected by a 37-64 vote following a debate which
disclosed objections to forbidding registration and regulation of fire-
arms.'4 Particular objection came from some New Orleans delegates,
on the ground the proposal would invalidate existing city ordi-
nances.'4 ' In light of this background, it seems that legislation taxing,
licensing and registering arms is permitted. This is consistent with
the general statement of the right since such legislation would not
abridge the keeping or bearing of arms.
An early draft had also referred to the right to bear "arms and
ammunition,"'' 2 but the final committee proposal and the final sec-
tion omit the reference to ammunition. It was thought unnecessary
to add that reference, since "ammunition" would be implied from the
right to bear arms.'8 3 Beyond this, the record gives little definition of
the scope of the "arms" that one has a right to keep and bear. It does
indicate a knowledge of existing laws prohibiting sawed off shotguns
and machine guns.'84 Continuation of the wording of the 1921 provi-
174. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), Cody v. United States, 460
F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972).
175. Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971).
176. See cases in note 174 supra. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1968).
177. Baton Rouge State Times, April 20, 1973, at 10-C, col. 4.
178. See note 172 supra.
179. JOURNAL, Sept. 12 at 2.
180. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 12 at 5-25.
181. Delegate Thomas Casey: "I rise to oppose this amendment and I do so princi-
pally because I am from a municipality that does have an ordinance establishing a
handgun registration law. It has been helpful in our area to have an ordinance of this
type, and the statistics do show it." Id. at 12.
182. Committee Proposal 2, § 20.
183. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 12 at 4.
184. E.g., LA. R.S. 40:1781-91 (1950). PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 12 at 10.
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sion in this respect with the knowledge of how it has been understood
suggests that those statutes would not be overturned.
Considering prior court rulings,"" it was probably unnecessary to
add in the 1879, 1898, 1913 and 1921186 constitutions the provision,
"This shall not prevent the passage of laws to punish those who carry
weapons concealed." Such laws were permissible without that lan-
guage. Still, the committee proposal continued the language and the
convention adopted an amendment to refer to "weapons concealed on
the person.'' 87 The author conceived of his amendment as prohibiting
statutes forbidding carrying of concealed weapons "in an automobile,
or in a boat, or in an airplane" or anywhere else but on the person. 8
Section 20 provides "Full rights of citizenship shall be restored
upon termination of state and federal supervision following convic-
tion for any offense." The reference to rights of citizenship, coupled
with the right of each citizen to keep and bear arms supports an
argument that bearing arms is a right of citizenship restored to a
person who completes his sentence. However, debate on Section 11
contains a statement by a strong supporter of the right to keep and
bear arms that carrying of weapons is not a right of citizenship.8 9
FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION
Section 12. In access to public areas, accommodations, and
facilities, every person shall be free from discrimination based on
race, religion, or national ancestry and from arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable discrimination based on age, sex, or physical
condition.
A most hectic debate surrounded proposals going beyond the
state action concept and prohibiting discrimination by private indi-
viduals as well as by government. The committee initially adopted
185. State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633
(1856). In a time when Louisiana's constitution did not specify the right to keep and
bear arms, the court held that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion did not prevent passage of laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.
186. La. Const. art. VIII (1921); art. VIII (1913); art. VIII (1898); art. 11 (1879).
187. JOURNAL, Sept. 12 at 1, 2.
188. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 12 at 6.
189. Delegate Jack Avant introduced amendments to prevent taxation or regula-
tion of the possession of arms and to add the language "concealed on the person." In
response to a question by Delegate Max Tobias as to whether Section 20 would "permit
a former felon to carry firearms," Delegate Avant said, "I don't think so because the
right to citizenship that is referred to in that section are the rights to vote and the
restoration of civil liberties." Id. at 7.
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this section by a 5-4 vote 9 ' and finally submitted a proposal that
reached private discrimination in access to public accommodations
and in the sale or rental of property.'
Early in its consideration of the proposal, the convention deleted
the reference to sale or rental of property.'92 Then, opponents of the
whole concept in an attempt to produce an overall proposal that was
too far-reaching to win final approval, joined some supporters in add-
ing additional guarantees by amendment. 9 ' In light of this strategy,
the committee withdrew its own proposal from consideration with the
aim of returning to the subject later.'94 Several days later, following
an off-the-floor lobbying effort, a compromise provision was adopted
with little debate;'95 the transcript of that debate occupies less than
three pages in the transcript of proceedings.'
The section prohibits discrimination "in access to public areas,
accommodations, and facilities." This language will have to be de-
fined in the course of case-by-case adjudication, but a significant
indication of the breadth of the provision is the fact that it was
inspired by the existing public accommodations sections of the fed-
eral Civil Rights Act'97 and that it was adopted with an awareness of
the scope of the federal law. Early in the debate, committee member
Delegate Novyse Soniat contemplated a broad construction, "public
accommodation is broadly defined to restaurants, taverns, barber
shops, nursing homes, clinics, hospitals, and for this reason I would
urge that all of you consider adopting this section. '
In some respects, the section goes beyond the federal legisla-
tion."' Whereas the latter consists of an enumeration of covered es-
190. Baton Rouge State Times, April 17, 1973, at 1-A, col. 8.
191. Committee Proposal 25, § 7: "All persons shall be free from discrimination
on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry, and sex in access to public accom-
modations or in the sale or rental of property by persons or agents who derive a
substantial income from such business activity. Nothing herein shall be construed to
impair freedom of association."
192. JOURNAL, Aug. 31 at 5.
193. Id. at 6.
194. Id., Sept. 5 at 4. At a quick committee meeting following adjournment of the
convention, Chairman Alphonse Jackson pointed to the political problems: "They
want to load it up and there's just no way anyone can vote for it." Delegate Chris Roy
characterized the opposition's strategy as, "If you can't kill it, make it look ludicrous
and kill it." Baton Rouge State Times, Sept. 5, 1973, at 1-B, col. 6.
195. JOURNAL, Sept. 13 at 8.
196. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 69-71.
197. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. I, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. See also PROCEEDINGS,
Sept. 1 at 31; Sept. 13 at 71.
198. Id. at 29-30.
199. In committee, Delegate Anthony Guarisco was quoted as saying: "I'm against
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tablishments, albeit broadly stated,200 this section makes a reference
generally to public areas, accommodations and facilities. The cover-
age of the state provision, in light of the legislative history, includes
not only the places of public accommodation enumerated in the fed-
eral statute, but also other establishments that are considered "pub-
lic areas, accommodations, or facilities." Whereas "accommoda-
tions" might be limited to food, board, and entertainment establish-
ments, the terms "areas" and "facilities" have a broader scope, ex-
tending for example to parks, playgrounds, bars, hospitals, etc. that
provide services generally to the public but are not enumerated in the
federal statute. Moreover, the provision makes no exceptions based
on size of establishment and requires no showing of affecting inter-
state commerce as does the federal provision."' Similar to the explicit
federal provisions, 02 the section implicitly excludes from its coverage
institutions that are true private clubs since such private clubs are
not areas, accommodations or facilities that offer services to the pub-
lic.203
Adoption of the amendment to delete the prohibition of discrimi-
nation in the sale or rental of property implicitly allows discrimina-
tion in that area.0 4 However, the section would apply to some types
of rental transactions that constitute a denial of access to public
areas, accommodations or facilities-for example, campsites and
some apartments.
the federal government trying to bring Louisiana kicking and screaming into the 20th
century. Why can't we lead the way some time?" Baton Rouge State Times, April 17,
1973, at 6-A, col. 4.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964) mentions "any inn, hotel, motel, or other estab-
lishment which provides lodging to transient guests . . . any restaurant, cafeteria,
lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain or other facility principally engaged in selling
food for consumption on the premises ... any gasoline station ... any motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or
entertainment . . . any establishment . . . located within the premises of . . . a
covered establishment."
201. Id. § 2000a(b)(1) exempts "an establishment located within a building which
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by
the proprietor of such establishment as his residence." See generally Id. § 2000a(b).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964). "The provisions of this subchapter shall not
apply. to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except
to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the custom-
ers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section."
203. Committee member Delegate Chris Roy indicated that private clubs are not
covered. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 1 at 32. The convention was made aware of the Supreme
Court decision in Moose Lodge No. 147v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). PROCEEDINGS, Sept.
13 at 77.
204. The federal legislation, of course, covers such discrimination. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-19 (1968).
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Borrowing from the formula of Section 3, the section establishes
an absolute prohibition of discrimination based on race, religion, or
national ancestry, leaving no room for rational bases or compelling
interests to sustain the discrimination. Discrimination based on "age,
sex, or physical condition," is permissible so long as it is not "arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable." Here again, the constitution
gives the courts freedom to determine reasonableness in these cir-
cumstances. For example, the record indicates that it was not envi-
sioned that the provision require installation of special facilities to
accommodate persons who are handicapped." 5
The last sentence of the committee proposal, "Nothing herein
shall be construed to impair freedom of association," was deleted
from the compromise amendment. The convention twice defeated
attempts to restore that language, fearing that it would limit the
applicability of the rights already provided for. 06
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Section 13. When any person has been arrested or detained
in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense,
he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention,
his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, his
right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to
court appointed counsel. In a criminal prosecution, an accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. At each stage of the proceedings, every person is
entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice, or appointed by the
court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable by
imprisonment. The legislature shall provide for a uniform system
for securing and compensating qualified counsel for indigents.
Once the standards of Section 5 requiring probable cause and
reasonableness are met and a person is arrested or detained, the
rights established in this section are activated to regulate police ques-
tioning. "7 A policy choice was made to incorporate in the constitution
205. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 70.
206. See id. at 72-77; Id., Sept. 14 at 8-12. Delegate Moise Dennery said, "by
putting this last sentence on as the tag into this, you might be destroying the very
provision that was adopted by this convention." Delegate Camille Gravel said, "For
all practical purposes, if we are going to adopt . . . maintain the amendment and the
intent of the amendment that was passed, we cannot let the amendment by Mr.
Jenkins destroy what was just done. Might just as well not have anything." Id., Sept.
13 at 75.
207. The record indicates the warnings would not be required to be given by
private citizens detaining others. Id., Sept. 7 at 15.
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a system of warnings and cautions similar to those required by
Miranda v. Arizona.20 8
The cautions are triggered and must be given "when any person
has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or
commission of any offense." The original committee proposal pro-
vided more simply that the cautions are required "when a person has
been detained. ' 20" The committee used "detained" rather than "ar-
rested" to prevent a narrow construction of the latter term and to
reflect the analysis of Terry v. Ohio which indicates that the fourth
amendment is invoked whenever "a police officer accosts an individ-
ual and restrains his freedom to walk away .. ."210 Thus, in the
committee draft, it appears that the cautions were to be triggered any
time a person is detained in the sense of being deprived of his freedom
to go as he pleases. Discussing this aspect of the problem, Delegate
James Derbes raised questions about the warnings being required
later in the criminal justice process, as when one is detained after a
bail hearing or after conviction .2 t Though the committee informed
him the section would not then apply, he later introduced an amend-
ment, largely aimed at other matters, which was adopted and which
used the terms "arrested or detained, 2 1 2 apparently intending to
exclude such later detentions. 23 This is not a substantial difference
in wording; the original broad reference to "detained" is kept, and
the narrower term "arrested" is added. From the terms used, it would
seem that the committee's intended breadth was not narrowed.
While at one point Delegate Derbes responded to a question by
indicating that the cautions might not be necessary in a stop and frisk
situation under article 215.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,", he
soon thereafter said that the scope of his amendment was equivalent
to the committee language and not more restrictive 1 5 The committee
208. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
209. Committee Proposal 25, § 12.
210. 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
211. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 69.
212. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 4.
213. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 45, 46.
214. Id. at 45.
215. Id. Mr. Lanier: "So would it be your intention, and this is for the purpose of
the law enforcement people who would have to operate under this provision, is it
your intention that this provision would not apply in a stop and frisk situation under
Section 215.1?"
Mr. Derbes: "That's my intention but I'd also point out that the scope of the
amendment, with respect to the circumstances of its administration, is equivalent to
rather than more restrictive than the original committee proposal."
Later, Derbes said, "As I understand the original committee proposal it used the
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language, of course, would require the cautions in those stop and frisk
situations in which the individual is not free to walk away. If article
215.1 is invoked in a situation when an individual is free to go, then
he is not detained, and the cautions are not required. However, if the
article is construed to mean that a person being questioned cannot
go away if he chooses to, then he is obviously being detained and the
cautions are required.
Seeking simplicity, the committee proposal required that a per-
son "be advised of his legal rights and the reason for his detention.","6
The term "legal rights" was used to refer to rights established else-
where which applied at this stage of the proceedings. Difficulty arose
because of the vagueness of that expression,21 7 and the convention
adopted an amendment by Delegate James Derbes to state explicitly
that the cautions must consist of the reason for arrest or detention,
the right to remain silent, the right against self-incrimination, the
right to the assistance of counsel and, if one is indigent, the right to
court appointed counsel." ' A result of this language choice is not only
to require that the specific warnings be given, but also to establish
those rights. Advising one of such rights would be a hollow formality
if the rights did not exist; the necessary implication is that they do
exist and that they can be exercised at that point. Thus, the right to
counsel can be exercised at the point of arrest or detention. Consider-
ing the Miranda roots of the section, it becomes apparent that one
cannot be questioned without his attorney being present if he chooses
to exercise the right."' This conclusion is fortified by the establish-
ment of the right to remain silent. This right, more than simply
guaranteeing that one need not incriminate himself, allows a person
to be silent and refuse to answer questions that would not incriminate
him. Again, the Miranda roots are apparent. Having this right to
remain silent is also a basis, when construing Section 16's guarantee
of a person's right not to be compelled to give evidence against him-
words 'whenever a person is detained,' and I believe that what the committee's inten-
tion was, in that instance, to say that whenever a person was detained by a law
enforcement officer as a subject of an investigation or as an arrestee, that he should
be advised of his legal rights. So I think to that extent they are equivalent."
216. Committee Proposal 25, § 12.
217. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 45.
218. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 4.
219. Committee member Delegate Ford Stinson explained: "And I think that
means that if a person says, 'I'd rather not talk to you until I have the opportunity to
see a lawyer,' and they should explain to him before he answers any questions, and I
believe that's federal and, also, state, that he has a right to an attorney to advise with
him before he makes any statement. I think it's just a reenactment of what the present
law is." PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 70.
[Vol. 35
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
self, for indicating the expected intent to continue existing jurisprud-
ence that the defendant cannot be called as a witness by the state at
trial.
The section also requires that the person arrested or detained "be
advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention." This applies
to arrests with or without a warrant, and to detentions other than
arrest. It constitutionalizes and expands the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which require an officer "when making an
arrest" to inform the arrestee of "the cause of the arrest."2 ' The
"when making an arrest" formula for stating the time the informa-
tion must be given comes from the American Law Institute Code of
Criminal Procedure, whose source provision indicates that notice
must be given before or simultaneously with the arrest."' The for-
mula of Section 13, "when any person has been arrested or detained,"
indicates that notice need not be given before the arrest, since the
past participle form of expression is used. It would be sufficient to
give the information simultaneously with the arrest or detention, or
right after that point when a person is in custody or is no longer free
to go as he pleases. As the apparent policy objective is to inform a
person why the law has intervened and why it is a proper intervention
in order to decrease the likelihood of resistence, the notice ought to
be given soon enough to accomplish that objective. A small amount
of flexibility is present here, for the section as adopted omits the
phrase, "immediately be advised" of the committee proposal, which
might have mandated a more stringent standard."'
The requirement of notice of the reason for the arrest or deten-
tion seems to rest on a different policy base than the other cautions
mentioned. Those from Miranda, counsel and silence, are designed
to enable a person to exercise his right not to incriminate himself by
removing the psychological coercion which might tend to lessen one's
will not to answer police questions. The time for giving those warn-
ings should be related to their purpose; thus, they should be given in
time to allow a person to be less intimidated during interrogation.
Since the requirement is enforced by exclusion of statements made
without receiving proper warnings, 3 it is essential that they be given
before questioning. On the other hand, the policy for giving notice of
the reason for arrest is related more to arrest law than to self-
incrimination questioning matters. Thus, it ought to be given simul-
220. LA. CODE CRIM. P., art. 218. See also id. art. 217.
221. Id. art. 218, comment (b).
222. Committee Proposal 25, § 12.
223. See text following note 226 infra.
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taneous with or soon after arrest or detention regardless of question-
ing.
The section does not contain the exceptions of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure that notice of the reason for arrest need not be given if
the person "is then engaged in the commission of an offense, or is
pursued immediately after its commission or after an escape, or flees
or forcibly resists before the officer . . .has an opportunity to so
inform him, or when the giving of the information would imperil the
arrest. '24 However, since the section implies that the notice need not
be given before the arrest or detention is completed, and since little
possibility exists that giving the information at that point could im-
peril the arrest or detention, that exception is hardly needed here.
Moreover, if the arrested person refuses to listen and, for example,
flees or forcibly resists, it seems implicit that the useless act of giving
notice at that point may be dispensed with. Once the person is finally
detained or arrested after resisting or escaping, the notice can be
given. The section by its terms seems to require that notice be given
following arrest even if the arrest is made when a person is engaged
in the commission of an offense or has just escaped.
Though not in the committee proposal, the section as amended
demands that a person be advised fully of the reason for arrest or
detention and of the enumerated rights. The added language indi-
cates the breadth of the requirement and comports with Miranda's
demand that the warnings not be perfunctory but that they be given
in a meaningful way so that a person can clearly understand them.2 5
It is also related to Miranda's waiver standard; the waiver must be a
voluntary relinquishment of a known privilege based on full under-
standing of what is being waived."'
It is not surprising that this section does not state the means of
enforcing its requirements, as the entire declaration of rights cata-
logues numerous guarantees without providing specific means of en-
forcement for any of them. However, the convention's virtual incorpo-
ration of Miranda in the constitution assumes continuation of the
exclusionary rule for enforcement of its provisions. This comports
with that same understanding as to violations of Section 5 with re-
spect to improper searches and seizures and invasions of privacy.
The section also treats the rights of the accused at points in the
criminal justice process further removed from the arrest. It repeats
the formula of Article I, § 10 of the 1921 Constitution in providing
224. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 218. See also id. art. 217.
225. 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966).
226. Id.
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that an accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The committee had proposed that the ac-
cused be precisely informed in a deliberate attempt to require more
stringent standards and to overturn existing jurisprudence.' Reject-
ing the committee language, the convention first changed it to "rea-
sonably informed" and then ultimately voted to continue the existing
language without an adjective.228 The effect is to continue existing
jurisprudence in the area, particularly that approving the short-form
indictment, 29 and avoids a possible return to an older conception
emphasizing the technicalities of indictment forms.
The section expands the rights of indigents to appointed counsel
beyond the latest decisions of the United States Supreme Court. An
indigent "charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment" is
entitled to assistance of counsel "appointed by the court," regardless
of the actual penalty imposed or whether it is imprisonment in the
state penitentiary or parish jail. 3 ' This goes beyond Argersinger v.
Hamlin,23' which holds that no one may be imprisoned unless he was
granted the right to counsel at his trial. Under that decision, counsel
is not required if the ultimate sentence is only a fine, even if the
offense is punishable by imprisonment.2 32 An effort to delete this far-
reaching proposal 3 3 was defeated in a debate which made clear that,
with respect to imprisonment, "the mere fact that he might have that
as a punishment entitles him to counsel.2 34
In fact, one statement during the debate supports the view that
an indigent ought to have appointed counsel for offenses punishable
by fine if he can be imprisoned on default of paying the fine.25 This
view is not necessarily compelled by the language used in the section,
for "offense punishable by imprisonment" could refer simply to the
227. Committee Proposal 25, § 12; Baton Rouge State Times, May 5, 1973, at 1-
B, col. 3; Id., Sept. 7, at 1-A, col. 3.
228. JOURNAL, Sept. 6 at 9, 10; Id., Sept. 7 at 2. Also rejected was an amendment
that would have required one be "informed with particularity."
229. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 465, comments (a), (b).
230. Since the word "imprisonment" is used and not the customary formulas
"imprisonment at hard labor" or "imprisonment in the state penitentiary," the refer-
ence encompasses more than felonies and includes any imprisonment. See LA. R.S.
14:2(4) (1950).
231. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
232. Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 731 (1973).
233. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 4.
234. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 50.
235. Delegate Roemer said: "If we had a penalty, and not a punishment but a
penalty, in regard to crime, but in default of payment of said penalty, you had to spend
time in jail then you'd be entitled to counsel under this provision." Id.
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penalty clause in the statement of an offense. 3 ' However, the problem
may be more apparent than real. If an offense is punishable by fine
only, Tate v. Short237 applies and forbids, on equal protection
grounds, imprisonment of indigents in default of paying the fine.238
Thus, this would not be an offense punishable by imprisonment and
the section's right to appointed counsel would not apply. If the of-
fense is punishable by fine or imprisonment, the right to counsel for
indigents clearly applies. Finally, if a person is not a indigent and
thus outside the Tate rationale, even if he is imprisoned in default of
paying a fine, he does not have the right to appointed counsel because
he is not indigent.
The section recognizes the traditional right of a person to the
services of retained counsel, referring to "assistance of counsel of his
choice." The right to counsel, both appointed and retained, must be
granted "at each stage of the proceedings," leading to the crucial
determination of what qualifies as a stage of the proceedings. The
language "each stage" may be contrasted with the "critical stage"
analysis of the federal standard3 ' and with the narrower statement
of the right in Article I, § 9 of the 1921 Constitution, which did not
include that language.
The section provides that the stage at which the right attaches
is the same for appointed and retained counsel. Equating these rights
supports the view that the right of indigents to counsel applies quite
early in the process, since the right to retained counsel has tradition-
ally attached at the earliest stage.24 Certainly, arraignment would be
such a stage. Since the right to a preliminary hearing, which is con-
sidered a crucial stage even under federal standards, is expanded in
Section 14, the right to counsel should apply at that point.2 "' The
incorporation of Miranda in the section clearly contemplates the right
during police questioning. 42 Even if there is no police questioning,
having counsel who is able to exercise the right to a preliminary
236. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a separate article (884) establishes
imprisonment in default of paying a fine.
237. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
238. See Comment, 33 LA. L. REv. 671 (1973).
239. See Coleman v. Alabama. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
240. For example, LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 229, in defining the duties of the booking
officer includes informing the person booked "of his rights to communicate with and
procure counsel." Article 230 enumerates rights of a person arrested, including, "from
the moment of his arrest, a right to procure and confer with counsel and to use a
telephone or send a messenger for the purpose of communicating with his friends or
with counsel."
241. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
242. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 70.
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hearing and to fix bail seems implicit in having the right to a prelimi-
nary hearing and to bail. Hence, counsel ought to be made available
immediately after arrest so those rights can be asserted. This conclu-
sion seems especially warranted since such has traditionally been the
case with respect to communicating with retained counsel.'" Further,
the committee comments referred to "the early assistance of coun-
sel."'2 "
More far-reaching is the argument based on the fact that persons
traditionally have been accorded the right to retained counsel at the
appellate stage. Hence, making the right to appointed counsel equiv-
alent to that of retained counsel would seem to impel an identical
conclusion with respect to appointed counsel.2 The same is true for
parole revocation hearings 46 and post-conviction collateral proceed-
ings.2 47 On the other hand, while this line of argument certainly seems
applicable to proceedings before and during the trial, since "the pro-
visions are arranged in the chronological order which the rights are
exercised, ' 248 and Section 13 forms part of the trial and pre-trial
guarantees, the argument may be less persuasive as to appellate and
post-conviction procedures, which are treated later in Sections 19, 20,
and 21. The record of the debate contains virtually no references to
the scope of the right after trial, and the emphasis in the comments
is to pre-trial proceedings.24
The final sentence, mandating the legislature to "provide for a
uniform system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for
indigents," was added by floor amendment.250 The committee pro-
posal concentrated on establishing judicially enforceable rights and
did not generally concern itself with mandates to the legislature
which do not lend themselves to enforcement through judicial pro-
ceedings. However, the convention, in an effort to encourage more
state efforts in this regard, adopted the mandate by an overwhelming
99-11 vote. In any event, though no enforceable device exists to re-
quire the legislature to adopt a system for securing and compensating
243. LA. CODE CRIM. P., art. 229.
244. Comment to Committee Proposal 2, § 12, in JOURNAL, July 6 at 4.
245. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (first appeal). But see Ross v.
Moffitt, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974) (discretionary review after first appeal).
246. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967); See Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1961).
247. Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); ABA STANDARDS, POST-CoNvICTION
REMEDIES § 3.1 (1968).
248. Comment to Committee Proposal 2, § 12, in JOURNAL, July 6 at 4.
249. Id.
250. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 3.
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counsel, the third sentence of the section is nevertheless enforceable
by the courts so that no valid conviction can be obtained unless the
right to counsel has been granted as required.
The terms of the mandate may not be clear in the reference to a
"uniform system." The natural meaning of the word would seem to
require one standard system for the whole state. However, the author
of the amendment, Delegate Thomas Velazquez, agreed with Dele-
gate Walter Lanier's appraisal of the provision that, "in other words,
in Lafourche Parish if we wanted to have the indigent defense system
we could have that, and in New Orleans if they wanted the public
defender system they could have that providing there was uniform
legislation establishing both systems." '51 At the same time, other
delegates questioned this construction and expressed the view that
"uniform" means identical throughout the state.252 Another delegate
saw the mandate as related to a public defender system.25 Still an-
other view reflects the historical development in Louisiana which
considers legislation as uniform if it treats all cities within certain
population classes equally.254 This last construction of the uniformity
requirement would correspond with Article VI, § 3, which allows the
legislature to "classify parishes or municipalities according to popu-
lation or on any other reasonable basis related to the purpose of the
classification" and to limit legislation to any such class or classes.
Finally, though it is implicit in the right to counsel that effective
assistance is demanded in the sense of meeting some standard of
qualification and performance,255 the reference to securing qualified
counsel makes that requirement more explicit.
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
Section 14. The right to a preliminary examination shall not
be denied in felony cases except when the accused is indicted by
a grand jury.
This section was not proposed by the committee, but was added
by floor amendment. A first attempt to establish the right to a pre-
liminary examination in all cases was defeated.25 A week later, how-
ever, the convention by an overwhelming 96-18 vote adopted the
251. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 39.
252. Id. at 40.
253. Id. at 41.
254. Id. at 43.
255. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1
(1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973).
256. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 6; PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 72-75.
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proposal which established the right in felony cases."'
An expressed goal of the provision was to change the statutory
provision which made a preliminary hearing discretionary with the
judge once a bill of information had been filed by a district attorney58
and to overrule court decisions which had narrowed the right further
by holding that the filing of an information even after a preliminary
examination had been ordered defeated the right to such an examina-
tion. ' In this respect, the language is clear. One has an absolute right
to the preliminary examination in all felony cases except when an
indictment has been returned by a grand jury, regardless of whether
a bill of information has been filed by a district attorney.260 In fact,
since the right exists "except when the accused is indicted by a grand
jury," the fact that a grand jury is investigating a matter or is
scheduled to do so does not defeat the right; it is only when one "is
indicted" (i.e. once the indictment is returned) that the exception
comes into play.
The contemplated purpose and scope of the preliminary exami-
nation is the traditional one of judicial intervention to determine
whether probable cause exists to hold an individual instead of leaving
that decision solely to the law enforcement agencies.2"' The conven-
tion had before it and discussed the Fifth Circuit case of Pugh v.
Rainwater,"' which reasoned that under the Federal Constitution a
person has a right to a preliminary hearing in the absence of grand
jury determination of probable cause to hold him for the offense. Also
envisioned was the requirement that the state produce witnesses and
the right of the defense to call witnesses.6 3 The preliminary examina-
tion should be held promptly2" to avoid incarceration for some time
without the benefit of a judicial determination of probable cause. By
the terms of the article, the right can also be exercised by a person
who has not been arrested or incarcerated but who has been the
257. JOURNAL, Sept. 14 at 3-4; PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 20-30.
258. LA. CODE CRIM. P., art. 292; PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 20.
259. E.g., State v. McCoy, 258 La. 645, 247 So. 2d 562 (1971); State v. Pesson,
256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970).
260. Delegate A.J. Planchard: "What this amendment does is it makes a prelimi-
nary examination a matter of right for the accused." PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 20.
261. Id., Sept. 7 at 72, 74; Sept. 14 at 22, 23, 25. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 296.
262. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, sub nom, Gerstein v. Pugh, 414
U.S. 1062 (1973). Whatever the ultimate effect of the Supreme Court action in the
case, the Fifth Circuit opinion handed down just a month before on August 15, 1973,
was what was before the convention delegates when the section was adopted. See
PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 25.
263. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 20.
264. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 293.
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subject of a bill of information commencing proceedings against him.
In either case, the preliminary examination will also serve as a discov-
ery device, at least to the extent the state is required to produce some
evidence to establish probable cause."'5
Before the right can be invoked, a felony case must be involved.
Since Section 13 requires that a person arrested or detained be in-
formed of the reason for curtailment of his freedom, which encompas-
ses a naming of the offense involved, he will have available the infor-
mation necessary to determine if he is charged with felony or misde-
meanor and thus whether the right has been triggered. Of course, the
section leaves the legislature free to act in defining the right to a
preliminary examination with respect to misdemeanors.
INITIATION OF PROSECUTION
Section 15. Prosecution of a felony shall be initiated by in-
dictment or information, but no person shall be held to answer
for a capital crime or a crime punishable by life imprisonment
except on indictment by a grand jury. No person shall be twice
placed in jeopardy for the same offense, except on his application
for a new trial, when a mistrial is declared, or when a motion in
arrest of judgment is sustained.
The Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections sought to lessen
district attorney discretion by enlarging the class of cases in which
indictment is required and to give an accused more rights in grand
jury proceedings."' The committee proposal required indictment in
all felonies necessarily punishable by hard labor"7 and gave the ac-
cused the right to counsel while testifying before a grand jury, the
right to compulsory process to present witnesses to the grand jury for
interrogation and the right to the transcribed testimony of witnesses
before the grand jury.6 6 These policy objectives were rejected by the
convention,6 ' the final proposal containing no statement of rights of
a person during grand jury investigation and making little change in
the class of cases in which indictment is required.
The section as adopted requires a grand jury indictment "for a
capital crime or a crime punishable by life imprisonment," while the
prior provision required an indictment only for capital crimes.270 In
265. Id. arts. 294-97.
266. Baton Rouge State Times, May 5, 1973, at 1-B, col. 1; Sept. 8, 1973, at 4-A,
col. 1; Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, May 6, 1973, at 14-A, col. 1.
267. Committee Proposal 25, § 13.
268. Id. § 14.
269. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 5, 6, 7.
270. La. Const. art. I, § 9 (1921).
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other felonies, prosecution can be instituted by information, meaning
an accusation by a district attorney.27 The discretionary power of the
district attorney in bringing accusations by information is increased
by Article IV, § 8, which diminishes the supervision of district attor-
neys by the attorney general. The attorney general can institute,
prosecute, or intervene in criminal actions or supercede a district
attorney only "for cause, when authorized by the court which would
have original jurisdiction and subject to judicial review." '72 However,
Section 14 does provide some means of protecting an accused's rights
against unjust prosecution by providing for a right to a preliminary
examination to determine if probable cause exists to hold a person.
-The section requires no particular mechanism for initiation of
prosecution for misdemeanors; the legislature is free to act in this
regard. It was not necessary to continue the language of the prior
provision that allowed prosecution of misdemeanors by affidavit,7 3
since the legislature has that power in any event. Article V, § 26 does
make it clear, however, that the district attorney "shall have charge
of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district." The legisla-
ture is thus precluded from establishing a system that would deprive
the district attorney of that power. 74 That section refers to prosecu-
tion "by the state"; the district attorney does not have to be given
charge of prosecutions by a city or a parish for violation of ordinances,
which can be left with city prosecutors.
The section establishes the double jeopardy guarantee in vir-
tually the same language used in Article I, § 9 of the 1921 Constitu-
tion; the minor style changes have no substantive effect.
The constitution fails to continue Article VII, § 41 of the 1921
Constitution providing that women would not be eligible for jury
service unless they had previously registered with the clerk of court
their desire to serve.
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Section 16. Every person charged with a crime is presumed
innocent until proven guilty and is entitled to a speedy, public,
and impartial trial in the parish where the offense or an element
of the offense occurred, unless venue is changed in accordance
with law. No person shall be compelled to give evidence against
271. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 384.
272. Cf. La. Const. art. VII, § 56 (1921).
273. Id. art. I, § 9.
274. His power is subject, of course, to Art. IV, § 8 discussed in the text accompa-
nying note 272 supra.
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himself. An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to
present a defense, and to testify in his own behalf.
The provisions proposed by the committee275 reiterating basic
existing principle were adopted with little controversy, and with only
one technical amendment.27 What caused much controversy was an
amendment, ultimately rejected, that would have added the right of
an accused to statements related to his case made by witnesses before
a grand jury or before state officials.27 This was an attempt to incor-
porate part of Committee Proposal 25, Section 14 that had been
deleted earlier. 279 The convention thus failed to establish an absolute
right to inspect prior statements of witnesses and leaves this and
other aspects of discovery to be developed legislatively and through
a case by case court development of the impartial trial and due pro-
cess guarantees. 279
New to the constitution is the explicit requirement that a defen-
dant be "presumed innocent until proven guilty." The statement
incorporates both the presumption of innocence and the requirement
that the state has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt, thereby
constitutionalizing two principles that have long been basic assump-
tions of criminal procedure and due process.2 18 Little debate on the
subject can be found in the records of the convention, so the contours
of the rights will have to be fleshed out as part of the development of
the concepts from their historical sources.2 81
275. Committee Proposal 25, § 15.
276. The reference to "take the stand in his own behalf" was replaced with "tes-
tify in his own behalf." JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 8.
277. Id. It provided, "Prior to his trial, every defendant shall be furnished with
the transcribed testimony or statement, for or against him, of any witness appearing
before any official or employee of the state or any of its political subdivisions or any
grand jury which participated in any investigation of the case for which he is being
prosecuted." The amendment was rejected by a vote of 43-65.
278. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 7.
279. See, e.g., State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972); State v.
Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945). The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1972-73 Term-Criminal Procedure 1, 34 LA. L. REv. 396, 423 (1974); Comment,
33 LA. L. REV. 596 (1973).
280. See State v. Hogan, 49 La. Ann. 1625, 22 So. 832 (1897); LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 804; LA. R.S. 15:271 (Supp. 1966), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 150 § 1. See
also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
281. The principles can be traced to Roman Law. "Let all accusers understand
that they are not to prefer charges unless they can be proven by proper witnesses or
by conclusive documents, or by circumstantial evidence which amounts to indubitable
proof and is clearer than day." CODE L. IV, T. XX, 1, 1.25.
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Of some uncertainty is the scope of the presumption of inno-
cence, particularly with regard to evidentiary presumptions that
lessen the state's burden of proof, for example, the presumption "that
the person in the unexplained possession of property recently stolen
is the thief. .. ."I'l To the extent that such presumptions require or
encourage the defendant to testify to overcome the presumptions,
there is arguably an infringement of his right not to testify.2 3 In this
area, the United States Supreme Court has applied a flexible stan-
dard judging the reasonableness of presumptions: "a statutory pre-
sumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection be-
tween the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the infer-
ence of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience. 28 4
The guarantee of a "speedy, public, and impartial trial" basi-
cally continues the predecessor provision.8 5 However, since the modi-
fying clause "in accordance with the provisions of this constitution"
in the 1921 document has been deleted, the new formula would seem
to make these guarantees less dependent on other provisions in the
constitution. The unmodified requirement of an impartial trial fur-
nishes independent grounds for court elaboration of additional re-
quirements to ensure impartiality in the trial process.2"6
The section continues the basic policy that an accused is to be
tried in the parish in which the offense occurred. However, the man-
ner of expressing the guarantee is changed; it is expressed as a right
of an accused person rather than an absolute jurisdictional require-
ment." 7 Thus, for example, a defendant could waive the require-
Delphidius: "Oh, illustrious Caesar! If it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will
become of the guilty?" Emperor Julian: "If it is sufficient to accuse, what will become
of the innocent?" RERUM GESTARIUM, L. XVIII, C.1.
282. LA. R.S. 15:432 (1950). See also id. 15:428. The presumption was upheld in
State v. McQueen, 278 So. 2d 114 (La. 1973). Accord, Barnes v. United States, 412
U.S. 837 (1973).
283. The United States Supreme Court has rejected this argument. See Turner
v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
284. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943); MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 344 (Cleary ed. 1972). See State v. McQueen, 278 So. 2d
114 (La. 1973). See also Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States
v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
285. La. Const. art. I, § 9 (1921).
286. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
287. La. Const. art. I, § 9 (1921), as amended by La. Acts 1962, No. 528, adopted
Nov. 6, 1962, provided in part: "All trials shall take place in the parish in which the
offense was committed, unless the venue be changed; except that the Legislature may
provide for the venue and prosecution of offenses when one of the acts constituting an
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ment.2  The change may also undermine the support for the rule that
the state must prove proper venue beyond a reasonable doubt.289
To provide for offenses occuring in more than one parish or more
than one state, the guarantee is phrased so as to continue the provi-
sion that trial may be had in any parish in which an element of the
offense occurred. This rule applies "unless venue is changed in ac-
cordance with law."29 ° The exception clause, since it is unmodified by
a restrictive adjective limiting the legislature, gives the legislature
great freedom to act in this area, encompassing not only change of
venue because of prejudicial publicity and the like, but also authoriz-
ing legislation for special venues for problem situations that the for-
mer constitution had particularized."' Since the legislature can act
in this regard, it was not necessary to continue the constitutional
authority for establishing venue when the exact place of commission
cannot be established or authority for providing for venue of offenses
committed with 100 feet of a parish boundary.
These constitutional provisions for special problem situations
were added by amendment in 1962 on recommendation of the Louis-
iana State Law Institute to overcome restrictive jurisprudence in the
area and are the basis for the present articles 611 and 612 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.9 2 The committee in simplifying language and
shortening the provision did not seek to change substance or return
to that restrictive jurisprudence; rather, the phrase "unless venue is
changed in accordance with law" was conceived as granting the power
to enact laws to handle these problems." 3 This allows the continued
validity of articles 611-614.
offense or an element of the offense occurs in a parish in this state and other acts or
elements thereof occur out of the parish or state, or when an offense is committed in
this state but the exact place of the commission of the offense in this state cannot be
established. The Legislature may provide for the venue and prosecution of offenses
committed within 100 feet of the boundary line of a parish."
288. See the discussion accompanying notes 7, 8 supra.
289. To the extent that the rule that the state has the burden of proving proper
venue beyond a reasonable doubt rests on the mandatory language of Article I, § 9 of
the prior constitution, it no longer has that support by virtue of the change in language.
See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 615 & comment (a)(2).
290. The change from the prior language "unless the venue be changed" to "un-
less venue is changed in accordance with law" emphasizes the power of the legislature,
consistent with the use throughout the constitution of the terms "as provided by law"
and "in accordance with law" to so indicate.
291. Explaining the provision on behalf of the committee, Delegate Ford Stinson
said, "Now certainly I don't see how there could be any objection to a statement of
that type and naturally it follows too that the legislature in its wisdom will provide
any additional change as to venue .. " PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 94.
292. See LA. CODE CRIM. P., tit. XIX, Preliminary Statement.
293. See note 287 supra.
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The section provides simply, "No person shall be compelled to
give evidence against himself." Deleted is the prior language that
specified that he need not do so "in a criminal case or in any proceed-
ing that may subject him to criminal prosecution, except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution." '94 Deletion of the reference "in any
criminal case or in any proceeding. . ." indicates that the guarantee
is to apply outside of trials or hearings and extends to police question-
ing. This is consistent with Section 13's recognition of the right to
remain silent and not to incriminate oneself during police interroga-
tion. Since this guarantee is in a section dealing with criminal mat-
ters which itself is in a group of sections dealing with criminal mat-
ters, it is implicit that the protection is limited to information that
would tend to prove guilt of a criminal offense. Even though the prior
language "that may subject him to a criminal prosecution" is de-
leted, the guarantee is not applicable to evidence that would estab-
lish civil liability, so long as that evidence does not also implicate a
person in a criminal offense. The existing law is continued in this
respect.295 Also continued, apparently, is the existing rule that the
prosecutor cannot comment on the fact that a defendant failed to
testify.21 The record also fails to disclose an intent to overturn exist-
ing principles which allow immunity statutes to be enforced.
The section continues the right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him. It also adds language to specify that this in-
cludes cross-examination. Continued also is the provision that an
accused has the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor and the right to present a defense. Added is the right to
testify on one's own behalf.
JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
Section 17. A criminal case in which the punishment may be
capital shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom
must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment
is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried before a
jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a
verdict. A case in which the punishment may be confinement at
294. La. Const., art. I, § 11 (1921) provided in part: "No person shall be compelled
to give evidence against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may
subject him to criminal prosecution, except as otherwise provided in this Constitu-
tion."
295. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225-33 (1972).
296. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 95, where Delegate Ford Stinson said, "the fact that
he fails to do so can not be commented on by the prosecuting attorney. It is reversible
error if he does."
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hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more than six
months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, five of whom
must concur to render a verdict. The accused shall have the right
to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to challenge
jurors peremptorily. The number of challenges shall be fixed by
law. Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury.
The section continues the provision that in capital cases297 the
jury consists of 12 persons who must unanimously agree to render a
verdict."' In non-capital major felonies (punishment is necessarily
confinement at hard labor), the jury continues to consist of 12
persons, but 10 must concur to render a verdict, instead of the 9 under
current provisions. 9 In the trial of relative felonies (punishment may
be confinement at hard labor) and misdemeanors punishable by more
than six months imprisonment, the jury consists of six persons, five
of whom must concur to reach a verdict. This is a change from the
bob-tailed jury of five with unanimous consent required.30 The provi-
sion was a compromise reached after opposition developed to the
committee proposal to require a 12 person jury and unanimous con-
sent in all cases involving a major felony in which no parole or proba-
tion is permitted.3 0 1
In stating the jury trial guarantee as applying to offenses in
which a sentence of more than six months imprisonment may be
imposed, the provision fails to incorporate the implication of Duncan
v. Louisiana'0 that the right to a jury trial exists if the punishment
may be a fine of $500.00 or more.0 3 In the case of misdemeanors not
297. The reference to capital cases is just that; it does not include life imprison-
ment. When life imprisonment was intended, it was expressed, as in Section 15. The
convention is thus not proceeding on the classification system under which the class
of capital cases under the prior law continued as a special class even after the imple-
mentation of death sentences was halted by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See State v. Flood, 263 La. 700, 269 So.2d 212 (1972); State v. Holmes, 263 La. 685,
269 So. 2d 207 (1973), distinguished in State v. Washington, 294 So. 2d 793 (La. 1974).
Compare PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 56, with Id., Sept. 7 at 81.
298. La. Const. art. VII, § 41 (1921).
299. Id. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 782. The less-than-unanimous verdict was
upheld in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972).
300. La. Const. art. VII, § 41 (1921). A six-man jury was upheld in Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). If 75 per cent concurrence (9/12) was enough for a verdict
as determined in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), then requiring 83 per cent
concurrence (5/6) ought to be within the permissible limits of Johnson.
301. Committee Proposal 25, § 16. See PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 2-6, 13-16.
302. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
303. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617
(1937); Comment, 29 LA. L. REv. 118, 124 (1968).
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provided for in the section, the legislature is of course free to act to
provide for trial by a judge or for various types of jury trials as it
might desire.
Ostensibly, the use of the normally mandatory formula, "shall
be tried . . ." would indicate that jury trial is mandatory. However,
it is clear from the last sentence of the section that an accused, except
in capital cases, may waive the right to trial by jury. The innovation
here, however, is the requirement that the waiver be "knowingly and
intelligently" made. The language is that of the federal standard for
waivers.3 04
The language used-"a defendant may knowingly and intelli-
gently waive"-as well as the failure to mention the state's right to
waive reflects the assumption that the state does not have the right
to a trial by jury.30 5 Fortifying this conclusion is the fact that the
declaration of rights as a whole was conceived of as protecting indi-
viduals against abuse of state power and does not concern itself with
the rights of the state or of a jury.0 6 Since the state does not have this
right, one of the assumptions underlying the position that indicated
that the directed verdict procedure was improper is removed. 07
The new provision continues the prior guarantee of a right to
challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of challenges to be fixed
by law.3°0 The innovation in the jury selection process is the grant of
the right "to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors" to an
accused. The purpose of the provision is to continue the traditional
Louisiana practice of allowing the defense to examine prospective
jurors at some length, as indicated by the provision for a full exami-
nation."" It prevents adoption of a jury selection procedure as used
in the federal system where the defense's ability to examine prospec-
tive jurors can be substantially circumscribed by the judge."0
304. See PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 16. Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 666, 693 (1966).
305. Compare the language in Section 4, where in expropriation proceedings, "a
party" has the right to trial by jury to determine compensation, including both the
private landowner and the expropriating entity.
306. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 28 at 45-50; Baton Rouge State Times, June 28, 1973, at
1-A, col. 1.
307. See State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969) as distinguished in
State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485 (La. 1973). In light of Douglas recognizing that
directed verdicts were proper, it was unnecessary for the convention to adopt a specific
provision on the matter of directed verdicts.
308. La. Const. art. I, § 10 (1921).
309. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 15. See State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So. 2d 12
(1961); LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 786.
310. FED. R. CraM. P. 23(a).
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RIGHT TO BAIL
Section 18. Excessive bail shall not be required. Before and
during a trial, a person shall be bailable by sufficient surety,
except when he is charged with a capital offense and the proof is
evident and the presumption of guilt is great. After conviction
and before sentencing, a person shall be bailable if the maximum
sentence which may be imposed is imprisonment for five years or
less; and the judge may grant bail if the maximum sentence
which may be imposed, is imprisonment exceeding five years.
After sentencing and until final judgment, a person shall be bail-
able if the sentence actually imposed is five years or less; and the
judge may grant bail if the sentence actually imposed exceeds
imprisonment for five years.
The guarantee against excessive bail repeats the language of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of Article
I, § 12 of the 1921 Constitution. Bail is permissible in an amount
reasonably calculated to assure the appearance of the accused for
judicial proceedings; it must not be excessive in the sense that the
amount would be beyond what is necessary for that purpose.3"' The
policy is "to obtain reasonable assurance that the accused will appear
for trial by a method that will not place an unnecessary burden on
him."3 '2 From this guarantee alone, it is arguable that preventive
detention is not permitted, either directly, or indirectly by fixing bail
at an excessive amount. However, the article further establishes a
right to bail in certain instances. In those instances the right cannot
be denied, and thus preventive detention cannot be used.
A person "shall be bailable," i.e., has a right to bail, before and
during trial in all cases, unless charged with a capital offense in which
the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt is great. This is
basically a continuation of existing constitutional provisions.',' As
under existing law, the judge does not have even the discretionary
power to grant bail if the proof and presumptions exist in a capital
case."4 This conclusion is confirmed by the failure to include in this
first sentence the language used in the second and third sentences
which makes bail discretionary in other instances. The stylistic
change, from "presumption" to "presumption of guilt" was made by
floor amendment to clarify meaning." 5 The reference is somewhat
311. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
312. LA. CODE CRIM. P., tit. VIII, Preliminary Statement.
313. La. Const. art. I, § 12 (1921).
314. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 313.
315. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 11.
[Vol. 35
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
anomalous in light of Section 16's constitutionalizing the presump-
tion of innocence and the particular reference to a presumption of
guilt with respect to bail thus must be considered an exception to the
general presumption of innocence. Its use also reflects the conception
of the presumption of innocence within its historical development as
a flexible and not absolute provision.316
In the interim between conviction and imposition of sentence,
one has a right to bail if the maximum sentence which may be im-
posed is imprisonment of five years or less; after sentencing and until
final judgment, bail is a right if the actual sentence imposed is five
years or less. In both these instances, bail may still be granted in the
discretion of the judge.
The wording here is important. The phrase "shall be bailable"
indicates that the accused has the right to bail which cannot be taken
away by legislative act and must be granted by the judge in accord-
ance with the requirement that excessive bail not be required. In
other cases, the phrase used is "the judge may grant bail," thereby
carving out an area of judicial discretion."7 Since this is a grant
directly to the judge, it is not within the power of the legislature to
govern the exercise of discretion by the judge. However, by virtue of
Article V, § 5, the supreme court has general supervisory jurisdiction
over all other courts, thus allowing it to oversee the exercise of discre-
tion of lower court judges in bail matters.
As the section is written, the exception clause, which withdraws
a right to bail in capital cases, applies to the second sentence-bail
before and during trial. The third and fourth sentences which deal
with bail after conviction and until final judgment do not contain the
exception clause. Consequently the judge apparently has discretion
to grant bail after a person is convicted of a capital offense and
sentenced to death, until final judgment. The record is not helpful
in this regard, and this problem may well have resulted from an
oversight. Allowing even discretionary bail after conviction of a capi-
tal offense would seem to be inconsistent with forbidding it before
trial if the proof was evident and the presumption of guilt great.
Certainly, if one has been convicted, the proof ought to be evident
and the presumption greater. After conviction there exists more pol-
icy justification for denial of bail, because a convicted person is more
likely to flee than one who has not yet been tried. In any event, the
language is there and seems to grant discretion to the judge; it is
discretion that ought to be sparingly used. Room for such discretion
316. See the discussion accompanying note 282 supra.
317. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 7-11.
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may well exist, however, in cases where a person initially denied bail
when accused of a capital offense is convicted of a lesser included
offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In those instances,
the situation is within the policy conceptions of the article that allow
the judge to grant bail.
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 19. No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or
forfeiture of rights or property without the right of judicial review
based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the
judgment is based. This right may be intelligently waived. The
cost of transcribing the record shall be paid as provided by law.
Not part of the committee proposal, this section results from a
floor amendment designed to cure what the author conceived as a
hiatus in the previously adopted article on the judiciary. Under the
judiciary article, a criminal defendant has a right of appeal to the
Louisiana supreme court if "convicted of a felony" or if "a fine ex-
ceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months
actually has been imposed."3 '8 In other criminal matters, no right of
appeal to the supreme court is specified; the provision is simply that
a defendant has "a right of appeal or review, as provided by law."3 '9
The policy, in the case of minor offenses, was to give the legislature
freedom to act, particularly with respect to review of convictions in
courts of limited jurisdiction which traditionally had been subject to
trial de novo in district court. The judiciary article did not constitu-
tionalize trial de novo as the prior constitution had,"' but left it in
the legislature's province to provide for trial de novo or some other
type of review in minor cases. Delegate Jack Avant saw this as a
deficiency:
So, the net results of what we have done so far in doing away
with the trial de novo, and in adopting the provisions with respect
to appellate jurisdiction in Article VII [sic] which we have
adopted, is that it is not only possible, but it is inevitable ...
that a person can be sentenced to six months in jail, or at least
five months and twenty-nine days in jail; he will have no right of
appeal, and there will be no right of review based upon any kind
of record."'
318. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D)(2).
319. Id. § 5(E).
320. La. Const. art. VII, § 36 (1921).
321. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 72.
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His solution was the amendment that became Section 19.322 The
section does not explicitly require a right of appeal or a record.
Rather, it employs a negative approach and states that no person can
be "subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property"
without the right of judicial review based on a record. Thus, even if
a right of review based on a record is not granted, the section is not
violated so long as a person is not imprisoned or subjected to a forfei-
ture of rights or property. This peculiar language gives rise to the
anomalous possibility that when the right of review based on a record
is not available, and one is sentenced to imprisonment, the section
will simply prevent subjecting a person to the sentence. It is a situa-
tion akin to Argersinger v. Hamlin,3 2 by which one does not clearly
have the right to counsel at trial, but cannot be imprisoned if he does
not have counsel at trial.
Determination of the scope of the protection here depends on the
definition of "imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property"; if one
is not subjected to those, he can be punished even though no right of
review based on a record is provided. Imprisonment certainly con-
templates any slight imprisonment, whether it be in the state peni-
tentiary or the parish jail. Forfeiture of rights or property was cer-
tainly conceived as encompassing loss of a driver's license.2 4 But it
is not clear in the record whether payment of a fine would be consid-
ered forfeiture of property or rights. Ostensibly, one has to pay
money, which is property, and the definition is satisfied. But, at one
point in the debate, the author spoke of three categories of penalties:
And that is that a person may be sentenced to actual imprison-
ment up to six months; he may be fined-or certain rights or
property of his may be declared forfeited in a court where there
is no record made of the evidence .... 325
Of these categories, (1) imprisonment, (2) fine and (3) rights or prop-
erty forfeited, only the first and third are mentioned in the text of the
amendment, lending support to the conclusion that fines are not to
be considered as within the scope of its language and can properly be
levied even though there is no right of review based on the record.
In any event, the policy is to encourage the providing of a right
of review based on a record. The standards provide a right of review,
with no room for discretion. It could be review by a district court of
322. JOURNAL, Sept. 6 at 8-9.
323. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
324. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 6 at 75, 77.
325. Id. at 72.
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matters decided by courts of limited jurisdiction. When the case is
originally in the district court, it must be reviewed by a higher court.
Yet, it is "review"-a generic term-and not necessarily an "appeal"
as the term of art is used in Article V, § 5. Even if no right of appeal
were granted from a city court, the section's requirements would be
met if the supreme court supplied review within its supervisory juris-
diction without full argument, so long as it is based on a record and
is a matter of right.32
Since the provision requires that review be based on a "complete
record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based," some kind
of stenographic or sound recording of the testimony will be neces-
sary.3 The section, of course, does not require that the record be
transcribed in all cases; but a record must be available to one who
might choose to take advantage of his right of review. If he makes a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right, the record need not be
transcribed.
The provision that the cost of transcribing the record shall be as
provided by law was not part of the original Avant amendment, but
was added by subsequent amendment,32 following an explanation by
the author that assumed the implications of the equal protection
provisions and indicated that there would be room for providing a free
transcript to indigentsY25 The amendment was adopted after rejec-
tion of an earlier amendment that provided that the transcript be
without cost to the defendant in all cases.33 0
RIGHT TO HUMANE TREATMENT
Section 20. No law shall subject any person to euthanasia,
to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full
rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state
and federal supervision following conviction for any offense.
326. What Delegate Avant objected to was that with no right of appeal and no
right to a trial de novo, "[tihe only thing that he has in the right to apply to the
Supreme Court under the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction for a writ of review.
Now, the way you do that is you attach a copy of all the records in the lower court
and send it to the Supreme Court. . . . The problem is that you are not going to have
a record. There's not going to be any record." Id. The implication is that if there is a
record to support an application to the supreme court in its supervisory jurisdiction,
the requirements are met.
327. The cost of this procedure was recognized, but it was argued that the right
being protected was more important than cost considerations. Id. at 78, 80-89.
328. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 3.
329. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 28.
330. JOURNAL, Sept. 7 at 2.
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The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment is derived
from the eighth amendment and Article I, § 12 of the 1921 Constitu-
tion. The new section, however, adds that no law shall subject any
person to "excessive punishment," broadening the prior prohibition
against "excessive fines." This gives the courts, in the exercise of
their judicial review power, a basis for determining that sentences,
whether fine, imprisonment or otherwise, though not cruel or unu-
sual, are too severe as punishment for certain conduct and thus un-
constitutional. It is a basis for extending the court's control over the
entire sentencing process.
The prohibition against torture comes from the prior constitu-
tional provision which prohibited subjecting any person under arrest
to any treatment designed to compel a confession.33 ' As proposed by
the committee, the section made that heritage clearer, for it also
prohibited "cruel, unusual or excessive treatments. '3 1 The conven-
tion deleted "treatments" from the proposal not because of any con-
cern related to questioning procedures or punishment, but because of
fear that it might be construed as preventing physicians from using
novel or unusual methods . 3
An innovation is the provision, "No law shall subject any person
to euthanasia." The definition of euthanasia referred to during the
debate was a common one-the act or practice of killing individuals
that are hopelessly sick or injured, for reasons of mercy.334 As pro-
posed by the committee, the language was, "No person shall be sub-
jected to euthanasia, "'3 5 but it was feared that this language might
be construed to prevent a physician from halting extraordinary life-
continuation treatments of a dying patient. A clarifying amendment
was thus adopted to make clear that the prohibition is limited to laws
requiring persons be subjected to euthanasia. 3 1
An important addition is the last sentence: "Full rights of citi-
zenship shall be restored upon termination of state and federal super-
vision following conviction of any offense.3137 The committee had
331. La. Const. art. I, § 11 (1921).
332. Committee Proposal 25, § 18: "No person shall be subjected to euthanasia,
torture, or cruel, unusual, or excessive punishments or treatments and full rights shall
be restored by termination of state or federal supervision for any offense."
333. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 22.
334. Id. at 25.
335. Id. at 22.
336. Id. at 24-40. The prohibition applies to state action, not to individuals. Id.
at 25.
337. In a provision adopted by the convention before it considered the bill of
rights, the governor's pardoning power was retained, as well as a Board of Pardons.
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proposed that "full rights" be restored,33 but an amendment changed
this to "full rights of citizenship." '339 The change followed a debate
concerned with the applicability of multiple offender laws and their
enhanced punishments to persons who had completed their sent-
ences. The committee's intent was that restoration of full rights
would not automatically erase the fact of a conviction, and thus
multiple offender legislation would be permitted under its proposal. 40
However, to clarify this position, Delegate James Derbes submitted
the amendment to change the language to the more limited expres-
sion ultimately adopted and thus suggest that multiple offender laws
would not be invalidated. 4'
In fact, in Derbes' view, his wording would not prevent adoption
of legislation prohibiting the carrying of weapons by convicted felons
or restricting the issuance of liquor licenses to persons who had been
convicted of an offense. 4' He explained that he had in mind restora-
tion of basic rights of citizenship, such as the rights to vote, to work,
to hold office and to be employed by the state.3 3
The formula used is not a term of art and it gives the courts
flexibility in defining the concept in light of the legislative back-
ground. Another indication of the rights referred to is the reference
to rights being restored. To be restored, those rights must have been
those taken away by the conviction.
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(E). However, in light of the later provision, pardons will seldom,
if ever, be necessary.
338. See PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 22.
339. Id. at 57-62.
340. Id. at 44. Delegate and committee member Chris Roy said, "a pardon simply
restores your rights to vote and to citizenship, but it doesn't change something that is
or was. It doesn't change the fact that you're white or you're black or orange or red or
whatever have you. It simply restores you to the rights that you had before. You didn't
have a right before to commit crime, so you still don't have one in the future to commit
it. It has absolutely nothing to do with the multiple offender law and Mr. Richardson,
in his comments before our committee, never was able to show anything with respect
to that."
He also said, "Most poor, ignorant, honest ... folk don't know that their citizen-
ship has been removed. They don't know that they have to go to the governor for a
pardon. Secondly, they don't have the money to get a pardon, and thirdly, they don't
know a lawyer to go give them the money to get the pardon. Now, all we're trying to
do is to say that if we believe in rehabilitation and we believe that when a man has
done his time and paid the state back for his crime, he should automatically get his
citizenship restored, which means in certain cases, the right to hold certain types of
jobs. There are certain jobs now that you can't hold if you've ever been convicted of a
crime without being pardoned. This simply provides that vehicle."
341. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8 at 57-62.
342. Id. at 58.
343. Id. at 57.
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Restoration of the right to vote, as provided for in the more
specific Section 10, prevails over the more general Section 20. Section
10 allows one to vote after he is no longer under an order or imprison-
ment; it is not necessary to wait, as this section provides, until the
termination of supervision incident to probation or parole. It is also
clear that any disabilities under state law resulting from a conviction
for violation of federal law would be removed upon completion of
federal probation.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Section 21. The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.
The 1921 provision was revised to recognize the writ of habeas
corpus as a right rather than a privilege. 44 The exception which al-
lowed suspension of the writ in case of rebellion or invasion if the
public safety required was deleted. It was thought "that emergencies
and other times of disorders are precisely the time when the writ is
most needed by the citizens." ' In effect, the writ of habeas corpus
exists as long as the courts are in operation to grant the writs.
The provision was passed with no amendments proposed.
ACCESS TO COURTS
Section 22. All courts shall be open, and every person shall
have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, ad-
ministered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for
injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.
The last sentence of the committee proposal abolished sovereign
immunity."' Since the convention had debated that subject earlier
and reached a compromise that became Article XII, § 10, the last
sentence was deleted.3 47
What remains is basically a repetition of Article I, § 6 of the 1921
Constitution. The committee had taken the 1921 language "for injury
done him" and recast it to read "for actual or threatened injury to
him." The committee was not proposing a radical expansion, but was
recasting the guarantee to encompass the existing state of the law
344. See La. Const. art. I, § 13 (1921).
345. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 12 at 28.
346. Committee Proposal 25, § 22: "Neither the state, its political subdivisions,
nor any private person shall be immune from suit and liability."
347. JOURNAL, Sept. 12 at 3.
1974]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
which gives redress for threatened injury through declaratory judg-
ments and injunctions.34 A number of delegates were unsure about
the implications of the change and thought "[i]f it was intended not
to create other causes of action . . . then definitely I think we ought
to leave it out. It is excess verbiage if it does not create anything
new." 4' An amendment to delete the words "actual or threatened"
was then adopted.35" The impact of the amendment is to leave the
jurisprudence concerning declaratory judgments and injunctions as it
developed from the former provision.
A committee change, accepted by the convention, replaces
"rights, lands, goods, person or reputation" with the new formula
"injury to him and his person, property, reputation, or other rights."
The reference to other rights represents a broadening of the section's
protections.
PROHIBITED LAWS
Section 23. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted.
The traditional prohibition against ex post facto laws and laws
impairing the obligation of contracts stems from Article IV, § 15 of
the 1921 Constitution and from Article I, § 9 and 10 of the United
States Constitution. The existing jurisprudence under those provi-
sions is continued.3"' New to the Louisiana Constitution is the prohi-
bition of bills of attainder, incorporating into the state's law the
traditional federal guarantee against legislative acts inflicting pun-
ishment without judicial trial."2
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Section 24. The enumeration in this constitution of certain
rights shall not deny or disparage other rights retained by the
individual citizens of the state.
Section 24 recasts Article I, § 15 of the 1921 Constitution3 5 to
348. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 12 at 31-34.
349. Id. at 38.
350. JOURNAL, Sept. 12 at 4.
351. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 4.
352. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 248-50 (1972).
353. "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or impair other
rights of the people not herein expressed."
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more clearly indicate that the section refers to rights of individual
citizens and not simply collective rights.354 The origin of the provision
is the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution.35 To
state that the enumeration of rights shall not deny or disparage other
rights is to give the courts a mechanism, in addition to substantive
due process, to expand individual rights through a case by case recog-
nition of "other rights." The reference to "other rights" removes the
possible implication of a narrowing of the due process guarantee by
the deletion of that phrase in Section 2.356
Though a section like this one is more appropriate to a govern-
ment of enumerated powers,3 57 the convention record is clear that the
section, like its predecessors, does not have the effect of limiting state
government to enumerated powers. 5 The state continues to have the
power to legislate generally in all fields, except as limited by the state
or federal constitutions or statutory provisions.
354. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 13 at 12.
355. Id. at 10.
356. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 29 at 24-50.
357. Id., Sept. 13 at 10-11.
358. Id. at 31.
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